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Abstract 
The concept of soft power has become an increasingly popular topic of debate since the 
early 1990s. A countries’ attractiveness can bring about wanted results without the use 
of hard power, consequently being an important attribute to a countries ability to 
influence the target. Equally important however, is the targets perception and the 
context of the relationship, making it hard to “touch” the intangible soft power and to 
measure it. Current thesis examined Russia’s soft power in the case of Moldova and 
Armenia with an aim to show how, how do they vary and what might be the reasons. 
The results revealed that while Russia has significant leverage in terms of culture and 
values, the use and perception of policy is different and brings about different results. 
While Russia uses hard policy in order to influence Moldova thus undermining its soft 
power, in Armenia, Russian military presence empowers Armenia and contributes to the 
perception of Russia as the security guarantor. The thesis confirmed the importance of 
image and perception and the distinction of how soft power is used: when soft power 
was used and perceived as controlled, soft power over someone type of way, it had a 
more undermining effect than when soft power was used to contribute to the 
empowerment of someone.  
 
Kokkuvõte 
Mõiste pehme jõud on muutunud üha populaarsemaks aruteluteemaks alates 1990. 
aastast. Pehme jõu oluliseks mõjutamise vahendiks on atraktiivsus, mis võib kaasa tuua 
soovitud tulemuse sunnijõu kasutuseta. Samal ajal on pehme jõu kasutamisel oluline ka 
sihtriigi taju ja suhte kontekst, mistõttu on raske "katsuda" immateriaalset pehmet jõudu 
ja seda mõõta. Käesoleva töö eesmärgiks oli uurida Venemaa pehmet jõudu Moldova ja 
Armeenia näitel ning selgitada, milles seisnevad nende erinevused ja mis võiks olla 
selle põhjusteks. Kuigi Venemaa oluliseks pehme jõu allikaks on kultuur ja väärtused, 
toob poliitiline tegevus ja sellest tingitud taju kaasa erinevaid tulemusi. Venemaa 
sõjaline kohalolek õõnestab tema pehmet jõudu Moldova puhul, kuid Armeenias on 
Venemaa kohalolek tajutud julgeoleku garantiina, tuues kaasa soodsama meelestatuse 
pehme jõu osas. Magistritöö kinnitas kuvandi ja taju olulisust pehme jõu uurimisel ning 
tõi välja olulise erisuse pehme jõu kasutamisel: kui pehmet jõudu kasutati ja tajuti 
 4 
kontrollitult, oli sellel rohkem kahjustav mõju kui siis, kui pehmet jõudu kasutati kellegi 
kindlustamiseks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of soft power has become an increasingly popular topic of debate since the 
early 1990s, when American scholar Joseph Nye Jr. described the power of attraction 
and the ability to persuade without using hard power. Starting out as a concept to 
described the USA experience, the notion of soft power penetrated from a state centric 
view to a worldly accepted and widely used concept. Accordingly, a country may obtain 
the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries admire its values, 
emulate its example, aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. “This soft power—
getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces 
them.’’1 Nye2 has pointed to three primary resources that generate soft power: culture, 
values, and foreign policy.  
The interest of the author of the thesis is to expand the research on soft power in the 
case of Russia, which has been traditionally seen as a case of hard power. Soft power in 
the case of Russia has been mostly described via power resources that are hard to 
distinguish on the basis of soft-hard dichotomy, especially when taking into account 
power conversion and Russia’s power behaviour outcomes. However, soft power 
depends not only on the action of agent but also on subjects’ perception. In order to 
study Russia’s soft power in a more coherent way, current research takes into account 
soft power resources and how they are being utilized as well as perceived in target 
countries. The author has chosen two case studies to illustrate the uniqueness and the 
universality of the concept of soft power both at the same time. The aim of the study is 
to identify, if and how does soft power affect Russia’s influence in Moldova and in 
Armenia, how do these two cases vary in the same framework and what might be the 
reasons.  
 
In order to achieve the study aim, the author has chosen to follow the concept of soft 
power developed by Joseph Nye. The first chapter focuses on the notion of power, and 
                                                 
1
 Joseph S.Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics (Public Affairs, 2004). 
2
 Joseph S.Nye, Jr., “Public diplomacy and soft power,” Annals Of The American Academy Of Political 
And Social Science, 616, no 1 (2008), 94-109. 
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more concretely on the concept of soft power. A literature overview is provided in order 
to map soft power research with a special emphasis on Russia. The second chapter 
describes the methodology and data as well as research limitations. The third and fourth 
chapter introduces Russia’s soft power resources using primary and secondary data. In 
order to put Russia’s soft power into specific context, a subject centric view, taking into 
account the perception of Russia’s soft power in the target country, is introduced via 
interview results as well as description of the relations of the two countries. Finally, in 
order to show the possible variation of the case studies, the two countries are compared 
and a conclusion provides a synthesis of results on Russia’s soft power in Moldova and 
Armenia. The author has used relevant books that form the basis of the theory, scientific 
journal articles and policy papers to elaborate on soft power research and included the 
main findings in current research. Various data from national statistics service from 
Russia, Moldova and Armenia as well as compiled indices from other relevant sources 
have been introduced in order to establish a more comprehensive overview of the study.  
 
The relevance of the study lies in the fact that soft power as a theoretical concept on the 
one hand, and Russia’s power on the other hand, can be studied in a more refined and 
conceptualized manner leading to result that may indicate if Russia’s soft power is 
having an effect in the target countries. The theoretical framework takes into account 
relevant research and criticism of soft power in order to address the issues of current 
study in a more coherent way. The thesis contributes to soft power literature by 
introducing both agent and subject centric view between Russia and the case study 
countries as well as elaborating on the importance of image and perception in soft 
power research.  
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1. THE NOTION OF POWER 
 
Power is one of the most disputed concepts in IR. The notion of power can be 
understood in various contexts and as such we can speak of political power or social 
power; categorize power by its resources and name them hard, soft or economic power. 
With this, one should not treat the concept of power literally. As Haugaard
3
 notes, 
words should be viewed as conceptual tools that help to create ideas and theoretical 
systems. However, it is hardly the case when theorists fall into one specific category of 
power debate
4
. This is also one example of how the concept of power is inevitably 
subject to disputes.  
At the most general level, power refers to subsets of relations among social units such 
that the behaviour of one or more units depends in some circumstances on the behaviour 
of other units
5
. Dahl’s agency-based concept of power states that, at its most 
fundamental, power entails the capacity of one actor to make another actor do 
something which they would not otherwise do in the form of A has power over B to the 
extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise have done.
6
  If to 
turn to social power, Barry Barnes
7
 argues that social power presupposes social 
structure; the success of A’s ability to make B do things that they would not otherwise 
do is premised upon the predictability of B’s behaviour. Nye uses also agent-focused 
definition of power as it refers to the common usage of the concept (for example in 
dictionaries). However, according to Haugaard,
8
 structure can be conscious on a 
discursive level, but more often than not actors fail to critically evaluate their acts on 
structural reproduction, so in what Haugaard
9
 has called the three-dimensional power, 
this is practical consciousness knowledge. 
 
                                                 
3
 Mark Haugaard, Power: A Reader, (Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 2. 
4
 Haugaard categorizes the power debate into four major clusters (languages): normative political theory 
of the analytical conceptual variety, political theory building of non-conceptual variety, and social theory 
of modern orientation and postmodern social theory. Haugaard, Power: A Reader, p. 2. 
5
 Robert Dahl, “Power,’’ in Power: A Reader, by Mark Haugaard, (Manchester University Press, 2002), 
p. 6. 
6
 Dahl, “Power,’’ p. 6. 
7
 Barry Barnes quoted by Haugaard in Power: A Reader, p. 304. 
8
 Haugaard, Power: A Reader. 
9
 Mark Haugaard, The Constitution of Power (Manchester University Press, 1997). 
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Constructivist Felix Oppenheim approaches to power in terms of a probabilistic 
causation thus, concepts of power can differ in the extent to which action X is either 
sufficient, or necessary and sufficient for the action Y to happen or to be prevented. The 
widely used approach in empirical theorizing is to use the concepts as variables, whose 
content needs to be fixed in order to allow for a rigorous and reproducible analysis
10
 
however, operationalization can have the risk of neglecting the concepts’ most 
significant aspects. Therefore, the dilemma of having a core concept that can serve as a 
communication tool between different contexts of a concept or having a rigorous 
variable construction is what an analyst must choose within, because achieving both 
might not be possible.
11
 One can note that the subject of current thesis follows the 
explanation of a concept serving as a communication tool between different contexts.  
In 1939, E. H. Carr mentioned a power of opinion.
12
 In the realist school of thought, 
power was reduced to measurable resources. Nye
13
 argues that there is no contradiction 
between realism and soft power but it is the legitimacy that is the power reality. 
However, the realist view does not take into account the fact that attraction and 
persuasion are socially constructed. The weakness of the theory of realism is the 
concern of how states define their interest and how states learn. In short, realist theory is 
better at explaining interactions than interest.
14
 Nye in collaboration with Keohane has 
outlined three main conclusions that reversed three realist assumptions: states were the 
only significant actors; force was the dominant instrument; security was the primary 
goal.
15
 Realism and liberalism in Nye’s view can even be complementary, as the 
sophisticated version of liberal theory addresses the manner in which interactions 
among states and the development of international norms interact with domestic politics 
of the state in an international system so as to transform the way in which states define 
their interest.
16
 
                                                 
10
 Stefano Guzzini ”The concept of power: a constructivist analysis”, in Power in World Politics ed. by 
Felix Berenskoetter et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 26-27. 
11
 Guzzini ”The concept of power”, p. 28. 
12
 Nye, The Future of Power, p. 82. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Power in the global information age: from realism to globalization  (London; New 
York: Routledge, 2004), p. 23-24. 
15
 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). 
16
 Nye, Jr. Power in the global information age, p. 3. 
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Nye´s definition of power is the following: “Power is the ability to influence the 
behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants”17. Nye also introduces a second 
definition of power, which states that the possessions of capabilities or resources can 
influence the outcomes.
18
 However, measuring resources is not the same as measuring 
power that brings expected or wanted results. The question that Nye addressed next 
was, which resources provide the best basis for power behaviour in a particular 
context,
19
 and this is another crucial fact: the resources that were important some time 
ago, may well be meaningless after some time of period or in a particular context. 
Steven Lukes makes an important note on the sources of attraction or indoctrination in 
specific cases: “Both the agent-centered, strategic view of Nye and the subject-centered, 
structural view of Foucault lack this distinction’ between indoctrination and the 
exercise of power that leaves those subject to it free to live according to the dictates of 
power of their nature and judgment.”20 In order to make this distinction between agent 
and subject-centered view, Lukes
21
 introduces a series of questions that lead to a better 
understanding of the difference and operationalization, which will be considered in the 
theoretical framework.  
1.1. Nye’s distinction between hard and soft power 
 
It is Nye’s belief that the rather crude distinction of power in different schools of 
thought should be left aside; rather, a careful case analysis can illuminate the hard and 
soft power strategies of a country. Success can be evaluated in terms of ethical values as 
well as effectiveness.
22
 The distinction between hard and soft power is one of degree, 
both in the nature of the behaviour and in the tangibility of the resources: both are 
                                                 
17
 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 
1990); Nye, Soft Power, p. 2. 
18
 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The Benefits of Soft Power,” Compass: A Journal of Leadership, 8, no. 2  (2004), 
p. 8. 
19
 Nye Soft Power, p. 3. 
20
 Steven Lukes ,,Power and the Battle for the Heats and Minds: on the Bluntness of soft power,’’ in 
Power in World Politics ed. by Felix Berenskoetter et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 
97. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. ,,Notes for a soft-power research agenda,’’ in Power in World Politics, ed. by Felix 
Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 172. 
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aspects of the ability to achieve one’s purposes by affecting the behaviour of others.23 In 
Nye’s view, command power is the ability to change what others do and can rest on 
coercion or inducement. Co-optive power is the ability to shape what others want and 
can rest on the attractiveness of one’s culture and ideology or the ability to manipulate 
the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes actors fail to express some 
preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic.
24
 Soft power sources tend to be 
associated with co-optive power behaviour, whereas hard power resources are usually 
associated with command behaviour.
25
 He notes that the distinction is imperfect as some 
deeds may be established by using hard power but become or are regarded legitimate 
later.
26
 For example, countries may be attracted to others with command power by 
myths of invincibility, and command power may sometimes be used to establish 
institutions that later become regarded as legitimate.
27
 But the general association is 
strong enough to allow the useful shorthand reference to hard and soft power.
28
 The 
second distinction between hard and soft power deals with the tangibility on power 
resources. Soft power resources are characteristically intangible resources: culture, 
ideology, values, and institutions are the most common examples.
29
 In sum, the 
distinction between hard and soft power is given by taking together the nature of the 
agents’ behaviour and the tangibility of resources.  
In Nye’s view, military and economic power both serve as hard power and can be used 
to get others to change their position. He notes that hard power can rest on inducements 
(carrots) or threats (sticks). These might be achieved using threats or payoffs.
30
 The 
most likely resources of hard power in Nye’s distinction are force, sanctions, payments 
and bribes, whereas the most likely resources of soft power are institutions (in agenda 
setting) and values, culture and policies.
31
 Nye uses also command power and co-optive 
power as an alternative way to distinguish hard and soft power. Also, if a country faces 
                                                 
23
 Nye ,Bound to Lead, p. 267; Nye, “Hard and Soft Power in a Global Information Age”, p. 176; Nye, 
Soft Power, p. 7. 
24
 Nye Soft Power, p. 7; Nye, “The Benefits of Soft Power,” p. 8. 
25
 Nye, Soft Power, p. 7. 
26
 Nye Soft Power, p. 7. 
27
 Nye, Soft Power, p. 8. 
28
 The forms of behaviour between command and co-optive power range along a continuum: command 
power, coercion, inducement, agenda setting, attraction, co-optive power. Nye, Soft Power, p. 8. 
29
 Nye Soft Power, p. 11. 
30
 Nye Soft Power, p. 5. 
31
 Nye Soft Power, p. 8. 
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hard power resources decline, it is likely to lose soft power as well, but it does not mean 
that soft power depends on hard power.
32
 
 
Military and economic power 
A well run military can be an attractive image; on a personal level, people might be 
attracted to strength and military cooperation and training programmes can establish 
transnational networks.
33
 Yet, military resources can undercut soft power- this is why 
military resources more often than not create hard power. Nye notes that more research 
needs to be done on the relationship between military resources and soft power.
34
 Hard 
power can also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for 
smaller states, for example, the Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe.
35
 But 
soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power. As Nye states, the Soviet Union 
lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though 
its economic and military resources continued to grow. Imperious policies that utilized 
Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power.
36
 
Economic resources can produce both hard and soft power behaviour (to coerce or 
attract). Successful economy is an important source of attraction but at the same time it 
can provide resources that can be used as hard power inducements in the form of 
payments as well as coercive sanctions.
37
 But as Nye refers to Cooper, in a Dahl’s one-
dimensional power behavioural system, there is little economic power if there is a 
consensual market conditions that clears the market.
38
 With this, power depends on the 
asymmetry of the market relationship. The more vulnerable one is, the more likely the 
other part can use this as a source of coercive power.
39
 In sum, complex economic 
resources produce a mix of hard and soft power behaviour.  
Nye uses the three dimensions of ethics (motives, means and consequence) and argues 
that soft power differs in terms of means and with regard to this dimension, one might 
construct a normative preference for greater use of soft power, even if international 
                                                 
32
 Nye Soft Power, p. 9. 
33
 Nye, ,,Soft-power research’’, p. 167. 
34
 Nye, ,,Soft-power research’’, p. 168. 
35
 Nye, Soft Power, p. 9. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Nye, ,,Soft-power research’’, p.165-166. 
38
 Nye, ,,Soft-power research’’, p. 166. 
39
 Ibid. 
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dialogues are not based solely on reasoned persuasion.
40
 Nye argues that it is just as 
important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others, as it is to force them to 
change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons.
 
With this Nye once 
again addresses the issue of soft power-hard power in countries power behaviour.
41
 In 
the 21st century, under the influence of the information revolution and globalization, the 
sources and distribution of power are being transformed in a profound way. Non-state 
actors have gained greater power and, as a result, more activities are outside the control 
of even the most powerful states.
42
 Nye has also developed the concept of smart power, 
where he combines both hard and soft power and indicates that the information age is 
having an increasing impact on countries’ interaction and power behaviour.43 In sum, 
hard and soft power are related and can reinforce or undermine each other because both 
are aspects of the ability to achieve our purposes by affecting the behaviour of others.
44
  
1.2. Nye’s concept of soft power 
 
Nye’s definition of soft power is the following: 
“Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than 
coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political 
ideals and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our 
soft power is enhanced.”45  
“If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do 
what you do not want. If a country represents values that others want to follow, it will 
cost less to lead.’’46 
The concept of soft power arose from Nye’s interest in how culture and ideas could 
contribute to power as he felt that the power of attraction often grows out of culture and 
values, but are frequently neglected.
47
 When Nye developed the concept of soft power, 
                                                 
40
 Nye, ,,Notes for a soft-power research agenda,’’ p. 170. 
41
 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Hard and Soft Power in a Global Information Age,” in Re-Ordering the World: The 
long-term implications of September 11
th
, ed. by Mark Leonard. (Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) London, 
United Kingdom, 2002), p. 4-5. 
42
 Nye, “Hard and Soft power in a Global Information Age”, p. 2. 
43
 Nye, The Future of Power. 
44
 Nye, “Hard and Soft power in a Global Information Age”, p. 5. 
45
 Nye, Soft Power, x. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Nye, Power in the global information age, p. 5. 
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he also referred to what has been called “the second face of power” which builds on 
Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz work.
48
 In this paper, Bachrach and Baratz study the 
elements of conception of power and how these concepts can be utilized more 
effectively in case studies.
49
 A crucial point that they make about decision-making is 
that a decision cannot be said to be a result of power or influence or authority or force 
unless and until it is specified from whose point of view the decision is being examined 
and that the distinction between “specific” intent and intent inferred from actual 
behaviour could be done.
50
  
Often misused, Nye argues that the term represents a series means of influence: a 
country can attract others with its culture, its values and domestic practices and the 
perceived legitimacy of its foreign policies.
51
 Nye states that common goals as well as 
interdependence is what drives countries to take the lead but it matters a great deal 
whether a country appears to be acting on narrow self-interest or a broad approach that 
incorporates the interest of others.
52
 He notes that soft power rests on the ability to 
shape the preferences of others. The fact that civil society is the origin of much soft 
power does not disprove its existence. As the state cannot simply create soft power 
resources, it should adopt behaviours, which exploit and reinforce the soft power 
resources it already has, and make sure its actions do not end up undermining them.
53
 
Nye also makes a link with democracy saying that soft power is a staple of daily 
democratic politics. He makes a distinction between soft power and influence, saying 
that soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by arguments. 
Soft power is the power of attraction that often leads to acquiescence.
54
 
How do agents win the hearts and minds of a subject? Nye argues that the spectrum of 
behaviour between command and co-optation runs through coercion to inducement to 
agenda-setting and attraction
55
. Soft power is attraction, but agents can control agendas 
and structure subjects’ preferences so that things appear attractive that might otherwise 
                                                 
48
 Ibid,p. 9. 
49
 Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework,” 
American Political Science Review (September 1963), pp. 632–642. 
50
 Bachrach and Baratz, Decisions and Nondecisions, p. 641. 
51
 Nye, Soft Power, p. 11. 
52
 Nye, Power in the global information age, p. 8. 
53
 Nye, Soft Power, p. 11. 
54
 Nye Soft Power, p. 6. 
55
 ‘ Nye, “The Benefits of Soft Power,” p. 8. 
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not be so.
56
 Whether the possession of power resources actually produces favourable 
outcomes depends upon the context and the skills of the agent in converting the 
resources into behavioral outcomes, which is not unique to soft-power resources and 
depends on the context.
57
 With this, Nye focused on the relational nature of soft power, 
answering questions put forward by several analysts in Power in world politics.
58
 In 
Nye’s view, countries that are likely to gain soft power are (1) those whose dominant 
culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize 
liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy), (2) those with the most access to multiple 
channels of communication and thus more influence over how issues are framed, and 
(3) those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international 
performance.
59
 The parenthetical conditions are the key in determining whether soft-
power resources translate into the behaviour of attraction that can influence others 
towards favourable outcomes.
60
 Soft power arising out of cultural attraction can be 
positive sum, but where objectives differ, soft power can become a zero-sum 
relationship. As Nye
61
 importantly notes, soft power need not to be used only for zero-
sum game, a positive-sum interaction may bring about the reduction of the likelihood of 
conflict. In his book ,,The Future of Power’’, Nye62 once again turns back to the essence 
of soft power. He argues that despite of the growing impact of economic tools (such as 
Russia is known to use) there is a limit to economic power as such. The diffusion of 
power to non-state actors, including transnational corporations and NGO’s make it more 
difficult to control market conditions.  
1.2.1. Soft power: resources 
According to Nye, soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: “its 
culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to 
them at home and abroad- acceptance) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as 
legitimate and having moral authority).”63 In terms of soft power resources, Nye states 
                                                 
56
 Nye, “Soft-power research,’’ p. 163. 
57
 Nye, ,,Soft-power research,’’ p. 164. 
58
 Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (ed), Power in World Politics, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2007). 
59
 Nye, Power in the global information age, p. 90. 
60
Nye, ,,Soft-power research’’, p. 165. 
61
 Nye, The Future of Power. 
62
 Nye, The Future of Power. 
63
 Nye, Soft Power, p. 11. 
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that the assets that produce attraction are the resources and whether a certain asset is a 
resource can be measured by asking people through polls or focus groups. Yet the 
judgment on whether such resources produce policy outcomes that are set as a goal 
depends on the careful evaluation and judgment of the context and particular cases.
64
 
This is why a case study that gives a deeper overview of a particular case is expected to 
have better result in evaluating soft power outcomes. Although attraction does not 
always determine others’ preferences, the gap between power measured as resources 
and power judged as the outcomes of behaviour cannot only be related to soft power but 
all types of power.
65
  
Co-optive power can rest on the attractiveness of one’s culture and values or the ability 
to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others to fail in 
expressing their preferences.
66
 The attraction to certain values and the commitment to 
honour or to contribute to these values is the currency that soft power uses.
67
 The 
resources that produce soft power in international politics arise from the values an 
organization or country expresses in culture, in the examples it sets by its international 
practices and policies and in its foreign policy.
68
 The political values and institutions 
strongly affect the preferences of others. When government institutions effectively 
uphold values like transparency, justice, and equality at home, they are naturally more 
attractive abroad.
69
 Yet, as Nye
70
 presents, some imitation or attraction does not produce 
much power over policy outcomes, and neither does imitation always produce desirable 
outcomes. According to Nye, policies can soften or sharpen hard structural edges, and 
they can affect the ratio of love to hate in complex love-hate relationship. Nye also 
notes that unpopular policies are the most volatile element of the overall image, and 
there seems to be more stability in the reservoir of goodwill that rests on culture and 
values.
71
 In this regard, as the current thesis builds mostly on Nye’s view on soft power, 
the theory indicates that policies can have a significant impact on enhancing or 
undermining the perception of a countries soft power in target countries. 
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The underlying conclusion that Nye makes (about the United States decline of 
attractiveness in his 2004 book, right after the start of Iraq war) is that it is not enough 
just to have visible power resources; when one talks about soft power, it is the question 
of what messages are sent and received by whom and under which circumstances; how 
that affects the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants.
72
 He then suggests that 
messages and images are conveyed partly by government policies at home and abroad, 
and partly by culture. Yet, the contextual analysis of soft power is of crucial importance, 
because the same message is “downloaded” and interpreted with different effects by 
different receivers and settings; with this, soft power varies by time and place and 
should not be treated as a constant.
73
 An important thing about the instruments of soft 
power is the fact that while governments can control policy, culture and values are 
embedded in civil societies. Moreover, soft power depends on credibility and when 
governments are seen as manipulative and information is perceived as propaganda and 
indoctrination, credibility is destroyed.
74
 
To sum up, the distinction between power behaviours and power resources is the crucial 
element in Nye´s concept of soft power; power behaviours (ranging from command 
power to co-optive power) are ways of exercising power. However, it is important to 
note that while any type of power resources can produces soft power (examples were 
brought in hard and military power section), at the same time, any type of power 
behaviour is not soft power. Nye explains that the “carrot and stick” policy does not 
have to be implemented, the concept of soft power is rather to attract via personality, 
culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or 
having moral authority.
75
 Nye’s earlier work on soft power faced the criticism of being 
too agent-centric and not focusing on the subject. In order to link soft power resources 
to behaviour, strategic conception as a missing element in Nye’s concept of soft power 
has been introduced by critics
76
 and the conflation of relational and structural forms of 
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power are contributed to the unstrategic conception of soft power. Nye’s later work 
started to address the issue of subject and context of the relationship, when he wrote 
about interdependent decision-making that took into account various roles such as 
leaders, followers and the context in which the relationship exists.
77
 Hence, a relational 
as well as structural form of power must be both included in soft power research and a 
study on their interdependence can lead to more comprehensive overview of the 
interaction. For example, the power of values or norms can be “exercised” by agents 
who want to change the values of others with the help of TV for example, but it can also 
be exercised by social structures when changing the policies of others within shared 
cultural and political values.
78
 It is important to note that because of the play of meaning 
(due to which social structures can be reinterpreted and reconstituted) that is inherent 
within intersubjective structures, the nature of these terrains cannot be conceived as 
being either natural nor necessarily permanent.
79
 While social structures may constitute 
and regulate the practices of certain actors, they are themselves capable of being 
challenged, reinterpreted and reconstituted by those very actors.
80
  
1.3. Russia and the concept of soft power  
 
The conceptual divide between hard and soft power resources and the case of Russia is 
thoroughly presented in a Master thesis by Andrew Michael Johnston
81
 who concludes 
that individual policy instruments can bring about hard as well as soft power effects, 
resulting in hard power acting soft and soft power acting hard. The blend of hard and 
soft power
82
 is a subject of debate among theorists and policy analysts. Due to the fact 
that the current thesis makes the starting point of its discussion on Russia’s soft power a 
resource centric approach (and only then proceeds to the subject oriented view), a 
further elaboration on soft power resources will be presented in the present chapter and 
in the analysis part. 
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Generally, soft power research has usually focused on a specific aspect (resource). For 
example, the most commonly used variables are public diplomacy
83
, student exchange
84
 
or theoretical aspects of soft power research
85
. Current thesis will present a brief 
overview of specific soft power research done so far with a special emphasis on Russia.  
The model on Russia’s soft power and China’s soft power has become a subject of 
Joseph Nye’s recent work86 when he elaborates on the possible future of the BRICs 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China), and also on why Russia and China fail when it 
comes to understanding soft power.
87
 He concludes that Russia and China make the 
mistake of using government as the main instrument of soft power, neglecting the 
phenomena of a society to society interaction. He also makes reference to the fact that 
soft power needs not to be a zero-sum game
88
 as it often is in the case of Russia and 
China. A thorough overview of soft power discourse in the case of Russia and China 
concludes that while the two cases have similarities in how the concept is treated by 
leaders (deploying the concept in foreign policy toolkit in a controlled manner), the 
underlying difference is explained with how the concept is being used.
89
 Russia, in its 
specific national conditions, follows the western type soft power techniques, while 
China, deviating more from Nye’s original definition, emphasizes the promotion of its 
culture and uses soft power in its domestic policy behaviour.
90
 Therefore, current thesis 
examines Russia’s soft power from Nye’s point of view as he is the original author of 
the concept and it has been previously shown that the Russian model follows a western 
type soft power behaviour. 
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The emergence of Russia’s soft power and its objectives have been discussed in various 
forms since 2004, when the colour revolutions started in the neighbourgood and Russia 
started to actively use other means than hard power to influence its “near abroad”.91 
Vladimir Rukavishnikov has divided different viewpoints of how Russia is discussed 
within the concept of soft power into four major groups, covering the analysis done so 
far and indicating that Russia’s soft power has been studied within extremely opposing 
views in essence,
92
 however, Nye’s approach has not been covered. An interesting 
overview of Russia’s schools of though and the motives of exploiting soft power behind 
Putin’s foreign policy established that Russia’s motives might not be so incompatible 
with the western objectives, the key issue being stability in the region.
93
 The issue of 
model of governance and how ‘regional authoritarian learning’ can explain Russia’s 
strength in enhancing its image is analyzed in a case study of Central Asian regimes 
which concludes the importance of ‘receptivity’ of ideas and practices, the provision of 
benefits (financial or legitimacy), and perceived threats to regime survival.
94
 Kazantsev 
and Merkushev have analyzed the role of a countries “image” and the importance of 
positive or negative stereotypes in relation to target audience,
95
 concluding that the 
importance of image in relation to Russia’s soft power is heavily underestimated.  In 
light of this, current thesis also emphasizes the importance of attractive national image 
and the perception of the latter in target countries in order to include a more subject 
centric view on Russia’s soft power research.  
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One of the most thorough soft power analysis on Russia’s and the EU’s influence in the 
Eastern Partnership region is the analysis made by Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson
96
 
that compares soft power as well hard power presence. According to the analysis, the 
most important “levers” of Russia’s soft power in Moldova and Armenia are prevailed 
by the reliance on hard power resources. The analysis also explains the EU’s prospects 
and how they can compete with Russia in the region. Leonard & Popescu
97
 have made a 
distinction between Russia’s hard and soft power resources (under soft power there are 
for example mass- media, the financing of the NGO’s, visa-free regime) and it has been 
shown, that when it comes to the neighbourhood, Russia’s foreign policy offers a great 
deal of carrots (better organized than the EU) but also sharper sticks. “While Europe 
has largely been content to sit back and rely on what Carl Bildt calls the “magnetism” 
of the European model, Russia – not usually considered particularly adept at the use 
of soft power – has learned the power of incentives as well as of coercion. Russia offers 
the neighborhood energy and easy membership of multilateral organizations.’’98 
A country specific analysis on Russia’s influence on Moldova in the time period 2000-
2008
99
 covers the first two terms of Vladimir Putin presidency and analyzes areas that 
are considered “most vulnerable to Russian interests”100, based on articles and reports as 
well as expert interviews. The study gives a comprehensive overview of variety of 
issues, however, it does not rely of soft power theory nor does it categorize the 
influence in soft-hard power terms. James Nixey has considered the political, economic 
and cultural aspects of Russian ‘soft power’ resources in the countries of the South 
Caucasus and Central Asia, concluding that, in terms of Armenia, the cultural and 
economic penetration (also in the case of Kyrgyzstan) is at its highest and a multi-
dimensional presence is one of the greatest asset Russia has in the region.
101
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Various research focuses primarily in mapping different approaches within the 
discourse of Russia’s soft power, applying a resource based analysis, or focus on the 
policy outcomes in determining soft power behaviour. The “Russian style” soft power is 
however treated more often than not in a negative way, hence the critics of soft power 
concept and Russia’s power behavior state that the use of force, coercion or payment is 
simply in disguise and wearing the image of soft power. It is the case of Georgian and 
Russian interaction after the 2008 august war, when every diplomatic move or speech is 
viewed in a hostile manner
102
 or the compatriots policy, which is seen in the Baltic 
States as not protecting minorities but undermining the Baltic States government 
actions. In a report on Russian soft power, Conley and Gerber
103
 tackle the minority 
issue in Estonia and raise a question whether in fact soft power is soft propaganda and 
the suggestion is that it might be a mix:”…a heavy-handed Soviet cultural propaganda 
model with twenty-first century accoutrements.’’104 In the case of Russia, the soft power 
concept has undergone a severe case of concept stretching- soft power is everything that 
hard power is not and sometimes it is just hard or economic power in a ,,softer’’ way. 
Matthews
105
 uses the heading ,,Softer Russian Power’’ to emphasize that Russian 
language is losing its grip among the Post-Soviet countries youth and thus it needs to 
regain its position by using softer influence. However, a more distinct categorization in 
terms of Nye’s theory based soft power resources, tools and outcomes can explain the 
importance of perception in distinguishing power resources and soft power behaviour. 
Despite the problems that occur when conceptualizing and operationalizing the concept, 
soft power highlights the factors of communication and image
106
 and according to some 
authors, may be a “safety net”, minimizing damage of foreign policy mistakes.107  
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1.4. The limits of soft power 
The limits of soft power are most often treated by the critics as something 
insurmountable, namely how to measure soft power. Public opinion and survey based 
research to measure soft power
108
 does not give a comprehensive overview, and in order 
to overcome this issue at least two kind of soft power indices have been developed.
109
 
However, these show the resource based soft power analysis and compare the countries 
performance.
110
 It is correct to point out that soft power does deal with intangible 
resources that cannot be “counted” like units of measurement. However, this does not 
mean that soft power does not exist or social science cannot take it into account. What is 
more, soft power is having an increasing influence in international relations and not 
only there: soft power is transcending to peoples’ everyday lives on a daily basis. Nye 
introduces two sets of soft power models that produce either direct or indirect effect of 
soft power (elite interaction or society to society, when elite is ultimately influenced).
111
 
A direct effect can be seen for example in elite relations (like the former tandem of 
Merkozy or G7 meetings, which does not mean that manipulation is not one resource of 
soft power). But more often, a two-step model in which publics and third parties are 
influenced, and they in turn affect the leaders of the countries, may occur.
112
 If to turn to 
the causal effects of soft power, process-tracing may detect multiple causes, but judging 
indirect causation through process-tracing might not be enough; a careful content 
analysis can provide for first estimate of the indirect effect.
113
 However, Nye does not 
explicitly address the issue of measurement and uses various examples and indices 
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stating that an indirect way of measurement will give a more thorough overview of a 
countries soft power.
114
  
Nye has referred to Steven Lukes, who states that even though it might be hard to 
distinguish the rational or non-rational modes by which the “third face of power” 
operates and how targets preference and self-interest is formulated, one can distinguish 
indoctrination form free choice in most cases.
115
 Therefore, the importance of 
perception and its evolvement that takes into account various aspects of influence is the 
critical point that produces soft power outcome. Lukes formulates a set of questions that 
should be raised in order to focus on both agent and subject
116
: “Exactly how do agents 
succeed in winning the hearts and minds of those subject to their influence- by wielding 
power over them or by contributing to their empowerment? How exactly do those with 
power ‘shape the preferences’ of those subject to their power? Or, better because more 
precisely: to what extent, in what ways and by what mechanisms do powerful agents 
influence others’ conceptions of their own interest?” These questions bring more 
preciseness to how soft power research should be conducted and what are the crucial 
aspects to consider when building a research design. Nye argues that the objective 
measure of potential soft power has to be attractive in the eyes of specific audience, and 
that attraction must influence policy outcomes.
117
 For this, the specific context of the 
relationship is important in order to establish the importance of specific versus wider 
audience importance in using its soft power. 
Another limitation is soft power conversion i.e. how soft power resources are converted 
to power behaviour (outcome). The chain of this argument (resourcespolicy 
toolsconversion skills target responseoutcome) is long and vague enough to 
create obstacles and fundamental misunderstanding of what soft power is. Nye uses the 
approach of Vuving
118
 and the critical ability to influence target perception. The crucial 
thing is whether the target responds positively or negatively. In this regards, there is no 
set of universal soft power skills that can be used exactly the same way and under any 
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circumstantial factors. However, soft power resources are conveyed into outcomes that 
have evidence and while exact process tracing might be imperfect, it is proof enough of 
how soft power in a specific case has worked. Measuring power in terms of changes in 
power behaviour may be misleading if we do not know what are the preferences or 
motives behind these alterations of power behaviour. Hence, as Nye argues, power 
always depends on the context in which the relationship exists. Of course, to obtain this 
knowledge might be impossible or very hard, still, this does not deny that even without 
a thorough knowledge of others perceptions, one might still have influence, if, for 
example, the actions are seen legitimate or having moral authority, which is another 
point of Nye’s.119 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
 
The following chapter introduces the methodology of the thesis. Firstly, the research 
problem will be introduced and a justification of the two case studies provided. 
Secondly, research questions will be introduced in order to establish, how the research 
problem is being operationalized. Thirdly, the research design and data with which the 
research problem is studied will be established. Finally, research limitations will be 
discussed.  
2.1. Research problem 
 
Stemming from the aim of the study, the research problem of the current thesis is 
formulated as follows: Is Russia’s soft power having an effect in Moldova and 
Armenia? If so, how is Russia’s soft power influencing Moldova and Armenia? 
 
Russia represents a power in the region that is alternative to western democracy type 
regimes. Yet, Russia has been successful in building its economy, state apparatus and 
until recently popular leadership and contained voters after the collapse of the Soviet 
regime. Moldova and Armenia are closely linked to Russia in terms of energy and the 
economy as a whole, but also cultural affinity (with Russian speaking minority) 
common history and regional cooperation, to name some common denominators of 
bilateral relations. However, Russia’s relations with the two case study countries vary a 
great deal. Moldova is currently pursuing EU integration, despite the long lasting 
political crises and weak economy. Russia’s presence in the separatist region 
Transnistria causes tension and shapes the relations of the two countries in a significant 
way. Armenia on the other hand, sees Russia as one of the closest allies in the region. 
Russia’s military presence in the country is uncontested and the two countries have a 
rather tight and friendly bilateral relationship. The EU represents a major soft power 
“force” in the region, having included 6 former Soviet Union countries (Belarus, 
Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan) in a European Neighbourghood 
Policy initiative, the Eastern Partnership. The Policy is a country-specific roadmap for 
 29 
further EU integration, but EaP has one major fallout: it is a partnership without a 
definite perspective of inclusion, which in some countries is under more active debate 
than others, enhancing Russia’s image as an alternative.  
Two case studies have been chosen due to the fact that soft power is a contested 
concept, which takes into account various aspects of interaction between countries A 
and B. Additionally, there is no universal measurement of soft power and a single case 
study can bring out the complexity of not only the concept of soft power but the 
interaction between two unique actors. An analysis of two case studies that uses the 
same framework can give a more comprehensive overview and affirm the validity of the 
study and help to bring more general conclusion that underlines the different aspects of 
the same theoretical framework. With this, one can study common dynamics playing 
out in different unique contexts.  
In light of the literature, the emphasis on Russia’s soft power resources and behaviour 
became more present after the color-revolutions in its “near abroad”, hence the time 
period of the research is from 2000-2012 (taking also account the last Russian foreign 
policy concept published in February 2013). The case of Moldova and Armenia has 
been chosen in order to show the relationship between former Soviet Union countries 
that have a shared history and how this might affect the gradual development of the 
countries relationship. Also, the two are both of comparable size, they are both 
considered to be in the Russia’s “sphere of influence’’, they both have frozen conflicts, 
where Russia is somehow involved, the two countries are also part of the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership initiative. Additionally, according to literature, Moscow places old Soviet 
Union countries in one of three categories: countries it has to control, countries that are 
not essential but that it wants to control and countries that are valuable but are not in 
Moscow's sights because they are easy to control. Moldova, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan are all in the third category.
120
 Hence, it is possible to use the same 
framework in both cases. 
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2.2. Research questions 
 
The research problem has established the focus of the current study indicating that the 
author of the current thesis has to take into account firstly, (Russia’s) soft power 
resources, secondly, how they are being converted into soft power and thirdly, the 
influence it has.  
 
In order to establish Russia’s soft power, the following question is raised: 
How and from where does Russia get its sources of soft power? 
 
Current thesis uses three main variables- culture, values, and foreign policy- to answer 
the first set of questions. At the same time, as the theory states, in some occasion, 
economic and military resources can also produce soft power. While focusing on the 
primary soft power resources followed by Nye’s definition, the study does not omit the 
effect of hard power resources that can produce soft power. For this, current thesis 
makes a first approximation of Russia’s soft power resources.  
 
Secondly, to find out, how soft power is being used, the following questions are raised: 
What are the mechanisms of Russia’s soft power in the target countries and how does 
the context of the relationship influence Russia’s soft power? 
 
In order to answer the second set of questions, an analysis of soft power resources and a 
semi-structured interview results is provided in the third and fourth chapter. With this, 
the methodology takes into account the crucial point of not only the influence effort of 
the agent but also the perception of the target.  
 
Finally, to study, if and which kind of effect Russia’s soft power has, the following 
question is raised: 
What are the main differences in Russia’s soft power behaviour in Moldova compared 
to Russia’s soft power in Armenia? 
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In order to answer the third question, the thesis combined the findings to establish the 
overall effect of Russia’s soft power in Moldova and Armenia and later compared the 
two case studies in order to establish the main differences. 
2.3. Research design 
 
The research design is stemming from the concept of soft power introduced by Joseph 
Nye but it also takes into account various studies that have measured soft power in a 
quantitative as well as qualitative way, bearing in mind that the current research design 
follows qualitative method. The compilation of the design follows the research problem 
and questions raised above.  
 
As established in the theory, the existence and trends in potential soft power resources 
are the first approximation for behavioral change in terms of outcomes. What is more, 
the thesis cannot rely only on research of Russia’s soft power resources done so far as 
there is no exhaustive list of power resources compiled and secondly, due to the 
timeframe and unique context. The available sources are used to build a potential soft 
power image and to illustrate the case of Russia. Hence, Russia’s soft power resources 
and Russia’s image world wide is introduced with the following indices: Anholt – Gfk 
Roper Nation Brands Index (NBI)
121
, Soft Power Index cultural sub-category
122
 and 
diplomacy and government sub-index metrics
123
, where a first approximation of soft 
power resources and the metrics can be found; World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators
124
 (starting from the year 2000 to 2011), Global Competitiveness Index,
125
 
                                                 
121
 The Index takes into account awareness, favourability, experience as well as rating scales on subject 
like export, governance, culture, people, tourism, immigration and investment. Anholt-GfK Roper Nation 
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Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. World Bank 
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Pew Research Global Attitudes Project,
126
 Eastern Partnership country overview,
127
 
United Nations Human Development Index,
128
 Democracy index 2012,
129
 Freedom 
House freedom in the world index,
130
 European Journalism Centre analysis,
131
 George 
Weber’s language influence study,132 the International Federations of the Phonographic 
Industry (IFPI) Digital Music Report 2013
133
, UNESCO World Heritage list,
134
 
Olympic profiles (2012 London and 2010 Vancouver),
135
 World Tourism Organization 
Yearbook of Tourism Statistics
 
,
136
 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators
137
 
(starting from the year 2000 to 2011), Nobel Prize winners,
138
 Times Higher Education 
World University Rankings 2012-2013
139
 and Times Higher Education World 
Reputation Rankings
140
, Russian Federal Statistics Service
141
, Global Go To Think 
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Tanks index
142
, newspaper articles, Rossitrudnichestvo web page
143
 and Russkiy Mir 
web page.
144
 The author has also considered Joseph Nye’s theory derived examples (on 
how he as explicated the U.S soft power
145
) as well as Anholt Nation Brand Index 
Heritage and Culture as one corner of the Brand’s hexagon variables.146 One has to note 
that when it comes to soft power resources, the selection that is introduced in the thesis 
is not in any way exhaustive. The soft power resources introduced in the framework are 
compiled on the basis of the theory and research done so far. The first approximation of 
values will be derived from the context of political discourse. A set of unique 
characteristics of Russia’s political discourse under Putin and Medvedev will be taken 
into account. This will be done via existing literature and secondary data to establish 
Russia’s government official discourse on the political values it projects home and 
abroad. The first approximation of foreign policy will be based on international 
relations between Russia and various other countries and organizations in the world. 
However, as values and foreign policy in some aspects are deeply interrelated, Russia’s 
foreign policy concepts starting from 2000
147
 serve as the basis for both sources. 
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2.3.1 Semi-structured interview method 
 
The interview method is used for conducting research on Moldova and Armenia. 
Secondary data is used to provide context for the case studies. The semi-structured 
interview was divided into three sections: culture, values and foreign policy and 
contained 10 questions making the total number of questions 30. The first section 
focused on Russia’s cultural soft power resources and their image as well as perception 
in the given country. The main measurement indicators were Russian cultural output in 
the country, specifically media, language, high and pop culture, brands and overall 
image. The second section focused on Russia’s values and their perception. Namely, 
shared values, Russia’s leadership and elite image, Russia’s political discourse and its 
perception, model of governance, attractiveness in terms of migration, study exchange 
and business. At this stage, the interviewees were asked to name any values that can be 
related to Russia and their perception as well as importance in the given country that 
first came to mind. It is important to note that the values were not restricted to political 
values only. The third section focused on Russia’s foreign policy and the perception of 
Russia’s actions as an international actor. Namely, the activity of Russian NGO’s, 
foreign policy events in bilateral as well as international relations, involvement in 
frozen conflicts, Russia’s influence in the target countries decision-making processes, 
the image of Russia as a foreign policy actor in the country and region, its perceived 
objectives in the target country as well as trustfulness of the relationship and overall 
image were the main measurement indicators.
148
  
It is important to emphasize that the interviews were semi-structured leaving the 
interviewee the option of explaining the answer as well as bring relevant examples and 
bring it different indicators than the ones introduced in the questionnaire. Also, there 
was an overall question introduced at the beginning or at the end of the interview: How 
would you define Russia’s soft power? This served the purpose of conceptualizing 
Russia’s soft power as perceived by the interviewees. However, the question was not 
introduced in the written questionnaire form due to which two interviewees were not 
introduced to this question. Another crucial point is the fact that not all of the questions 
                                                 
148
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were answered by all of the interviewees, however, the three categories were the subject 
of every interviewee in its various forms. 
 
The interviewees were selected based on their expertise and knowledge of the case 
study countries and the region. For this, contacts were gathered browsing various policy 
institutes (think tanks) web pages world wide with a specific emphasis on the projects 
related to Russia and the region. Policy institutes and non-profit organization web pages 
of Moldova and Armenia were also browsed to seek contacts from these countries. 
Various experts residing in Estonia were also contacted to answer the interviews or 
provide possible contacts namely in the target countries. Approximately 25 interview 
inquiries in English and 2 in Estonian with a cover letter and interview questions were 
sent out to different experts or professionals asking for an interview personally, via 
Skype or in a written forms. Some respondents referred the author to other experts in 
the field and another 10 interview inquiries were sent to new contacts. All of the 
interviewees were provided with the semi-structured interview questions beforehand. 
During personal or Skype interviews, the same question set provided as the basis of the 
interview and additional questions were asked to clarify or expand the answers. All of 
the interviews were fully recorded. The interviewer translated the questions in order to 
conduct the interviews in languages other than English. However, all of the 
interviewees stated that the English version sent beforehand was sufficient in 
understanding the questions.   
 
All together, 14 interviews were conducted starting from the 12
th
 of March to 30
th
 of 
April 2013. The length of the interviews varied from 21 minutes to 3 hours and 36 
minutes. Out of 14 interviews, 10 were conducted in English, 2 in Estonian and 2 in 
Russian language. The interviewer conducted 3 personal interviews (two in Tallinn and 
one in Tartu), 9 interviews were conducted via Skype and 2 interviews were submitted 
in a written form. Due to the fact that some of the interviewees claimed anonymity, the 
author divided the respondents according to their occupation. The composition of the 
interviewees were as follows: 
 1) 5 international experts:  
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 International expert no. 1- European Council on Foreign Relations policy fellow 
since 2009, in the field of EU’s foreign policy towards the Eastern partnership 
countries and Russia, Central Asia and democratization in the post-Soviet space.  
 International expert no. 2- Professor of International Relations in Linguistic 
University and Professor of Political Science in Public Service Academy; has 
been a visiting fellow in over 10 institutions, research fields include Russian 
foreign policy analysis, international security and regionalism. Additionally, has 
published several articles on Russia’s soft power. 
 International expert no. 3- Historian and political scientist specializing in 
Eastern Europe, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign 
Relations, published on the politics and culture of the European neighbourhood, 
and on the comparative politics of democratization in the post-Soviet states. 
 International expert no. 4- Communications professional (20 years of experience 
gained from the public sector, as a consultant and trainer for the UNDP and as 
an international expert for the EU.) Has provided strategic communications 
advice including government offices in Moldova (Public relations training 
expert EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM)), 
currently an international expert for the EU in Armenia. 
 International expert no. 5- Currently a visiting fellow in the CSIS Russia and 
Eurasia Program. The interviewee is an expert on the Caucasus, as well as Black 
Sea, regional security, nationalism, interethnic conflicts and de-facto states in 
the Post-Soviet area. 
2) 2 diplomats (Due to the request of the interviewees, the interviewer can only 
disclose the fact that the interviewees are diplomats of Moldova) 
 Diplomat no. 1- University professor in social science department, later became 
a diplomat. 
 Diplomat no.2. – Academic by first profession, became a diplomat later. 
3) 4 national experts (Due to the request of one interviewee, the interviewer can 
only disclose the fact that the interviewees are national experts of the target 
countries) 
 National expert no. 1- Political scientist and analyst/researcher on Armenia and 
Russia, specializing in history and bilateral relation. 
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 National expert no. 2- ICSRD (Institute for Civil Society and Regional 
Development) think-tank expert, covering the major political, economic and 
social issues facing Armenia, Caucasus and the neighbourhood. 
 National expert no. 3- Political expert, currently in IDIS (Institute for 
Development and Social Initiatives) “Viitorul”, has publisher extensively on 
Russia and the post-Soviet space.  
 National expert no. 4- Having an background of policy fellow and analyst for a 
renowned think tank, currently working for one of the target countries 
government as a policy expert. 
4) 1 NGO representative 
 NGO representative no. 1- Representative of Armenian NGO, engaged in youth 
activity and Armenian diaspora activities. Currently working for an international 
IT-company. 
5) 1 academic 
 Academic no. 1- An Armenian academic specialized in international law, 
currently living in UK. 
6) 1 student (with previous experience in international cooperation projects) 
 Student no. 1- Moldovan professional in cross-border cooperation and regional 
projects, currently a student in Estonia. 
 
Due to the fact that 5 international experts addressed both target countries, 10 
interviewees answered the questions about Moldova and 9 interviewees about Armenia. 
The nationality of 8 interviewees was either Moldovan or Armenian. Non of the 5 
international experts nationality was that of the target countries, but two of them have 
Russian nationality. 
 
The interview data was used to establish an organizing system built upon the theoretical 
framework and research questions as well as constructed with the data itself. Sections of 
data with topics noted (above) were sorted by coding labels for categories based on soft 
power resources and their perception. The codes included country abbreviations to 
distinguish the two case studies in order to make country specific conclusions. The final 
stage of analysis consisted of re-contextualizing the categories into one pool of 
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meaning
149
 under the three major categories (culture, values, policy) to analyze 
interviewees’ answers and attitudes. The specific question on conceptualizing Russia’s 
soft power in the stage of re-contextualizing took into account the soft power resources 
driven analysis done by the author as well as the specific characteristics of Russia’s soft 
power in terms of the overall image and perception data gathered during the interviews. 
A conclusion of similarities and differences of the case studies is provided to put the 
findings in perspective and the main findings of the thesis are presented in the 
conclusion. 
2.4. Research limitations 
Due to the fact that Nye’s soft power theory does not explicitly state the methodology in 
great detail other than introducing a direct effect model and an indirect effect model, 
latter being more effective and comprehensive, the author has include suggestions from 
scholars like Lukes
150
 and Bachrach and Baratz
151
 to conduct soft power research in a 
more comprehensive way. These supplements build upon Nye’s indirect model of 
effect, however, the proposed research design is only one of the ways how soft power 
can be studied. 
In terms of gathering quantitative data, one of the main problems was the accessibility 
of data and the time frame it covered. The issue posed more problems in terms of 
finding proper data for Armenia. Also, the author is not a native speaker of the two 
countries and could only rely on data found in English or in Russian. In terms of 
interviews, the author of the thesis did not see major obstacles other that some concepts 
that were named in English as well as when the interview was not conducted in English. 
However, the questions presupposed that the respondent is to some extent aware of the 
concepts
152
 and familiar with the situation and follows the issues raised, which is why 
an expert sample was chosen. Also, due to the fact that the method was a semi-
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structured interview, not all of the questions were answered by all of the interviewees, 
however, the purpose for choosing such a method was the fact that the respondent could 
be as open as they could about the questions, giving more accurate overview of the 
various issues.  
If to briefly introduce the interviewees subjectivity on the issues, the author can note 
that out of the 14 interviewees, the 5 international experts approached Russia’s soft 
power in a more pragmatic or even skeptical way. However, other interviewees 
perceived the connectedness and Russia’s role in the country in a much more profound 
way underlying the significance of current analysis. Overall, the sample expressed 
pluralistic views and hence the author considers the results balanced. The sample of 14 
interviewees may not cover all aspects and opinions and cannot be treated as inductive 
reasoning especially if it comes to perception. Nevertheless, the views of the 
interviewees were presented as rather balanced due to their expertise and knowledge. At 
the same time, perception can never be treated as something objective and it is always 
the subject of debate. Thus, the sample of expertise tried to combine various professions 
in order to have an objective outcome. The interviewer at this point tried to be as 
objective as possible and abstained from any personal views when conducting the 
research. 
The question of evaluating the “effectiveness” or influence of soft power in the case of 
outcomes is not solved completely. Current thesis takes into account the value of 
perception as an indicator of attractiveness, due to the fact that soft power is not about 
how the agent views itself, but how others (the subject) sees you. In this regard, soft 
power influence based on the resources, government actions and interview answers 
serve as the data for evaluating attractiveness. The differentiation of state and society 
and the interconnectedness of shaping others views via government interaction or civil 
society however need to be further researched. Thus, the limits of soft power are shown, 
but the hypothesis was not disproven.  
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3. ANALYSIS 
 
The analysis of Russia’s soft power and the case studies will be provided in the present 
and next chapter. One indicator that combines various variables of soft power is the 
Strength of National brand, which might be a more universal measurement and does not 
project only the cultural output a country has. A significant aspect of this is that it does 
not apply to specific countries view, but an overall view. This can give an implicit 
image of the country still. According to data published by the Anholt – Gfk Roper 
Nation Brands Index (NBI)
153
, in 2006 Q4
154
, Russia ranked 21
st
 out of 38 countries. In 
2007Q3 Russia ranked 22
nd
 out of 35 countries. In 2008, Russia was ranked 22
nd
 out of 
50 NBI target countries. Considering the fact that the country brand has some leverage, 
Russia’s overall image is analyzed in a more detailed way as follows.  
3.1. Russia’s culture as a source of soft power 
Current thesis will use the examples of high and popular culture, media, language, 
music and sports in order to illustrate Russia’s culture. In terms of cultural image (a 
separate measure), Russia ranked 7
th
 in the 2008 NBI index
155
 and 10
th
 according to the 
soft power index in 2011
156
, which indicates a significantly higher ranking than the 
overall position of Russia in both indices. Regarding Russia’s high culture, the author of 
the current thesis believes it is a common knowledge, that there are renowned classics 
popular all over the world. Russian literature, artists, music and philosophy, but also 
theater, ballet, painting, folklore and architecture are known all over the world. Also, 
not only is the list of cultural icons endless, it is worldly renowned. This fact is also 
highlighted by different indices (soft power or nations brand index) that confirm the 
high ranking of Russia’s culture compared to the overall rankings in the world. Russian 
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Orthodox Church
157
 and the Patriarch hold an important position among the members of 
the church and in the Russian society. It is estimated that the Moscow Patriarchate has 
over 150 million members in more than 60 countries around the world.
158
 With this, a 
significant source of power that is unique to Russia has to be taken into account when 
analyzing Russia’s soft power. 
In order to find out the potential reach of state sponsored media outlet, the author firstly 
looks at the overall situation of Russia’s media outlet in the world. Yet, one has to 
consider the fact that cultural similarities and closeness might play a significant role 
when it comes to certain type of media reach (one has to consider the cultural affinity 
and language factor). On the other hand, the US popular culture has penetrated all over 
the world, thus making global media reach a significant factor in enhancing its soft 
power. According to European Journalism Centre
159
, there are about 93 000 registered 
media outlets in Russia, including 27 000 print media outlets and 330 television 
channels. Additionally, Russia has the largest number of journalists in the world (more 
than 100,000), followed by China and the United States.
160
  The most popular media 
channels vary to some degree depending on the source but most commonly newspapers 
like Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moskovsky Komsomolets, Argumenty i Fakty, Vedomosti, 
Kommersant and Izvestia but also Moscow Times are referred to.
161
 Some of the most 
popular radio stations include Mayak, Ekho Moskvy and Russkoe Radio but the list is 
not exhaustive.  
TV is regarded as one of the most influential media channels in Russia. According to 
the Federal State Statistics Service, the public channels such as Rossiya, Pervyj Kanal 
and NTV are the most popular (figures from 2010).
162
 In 2005 Russia launched an 
English-language satellite channel, Russia Today and the channel is broadcasted in over 
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100 countries.
163
 The three biggest news agencies in Russia are ITAR-TASS, RIA 
Novosti and Interfax, that all have correspondents all over the world and operate and 
broadcast in several countries including the CIS. According to the European Journalism 
Center analysis,
164
 production of TV serials based on the classics of the Russian and 
Soviet literature has become particularly popular in recent years. Overall, Soviet-era 
movies continue to be extremely popular in the country indicating that this can be the 
same in Post-Soviet countries. The media landscape is strongly affected by state 
ownership through its close ties with the businesses world and state controlled 
regulatory bodies and media-related legislation.  
An important indicator of Russia’s cultural soft power resource is its language. 
According to George Weber’s index of the global power of native language based on 
population, economy, secondary speakers production of IP in language, Russia ranks 
fourth among the world’s ten most influential languages.165 Although published in 
1997, the author indicates that the language will have uncertain times especially when it 
comes to the former Soviet states but will probably stay in the top 10 languages. 
Although there is other empirical research done as well, most of them refer to Weber’s 
article and in various top 10 lists Russian language still remains among the 10 
languages.  
In music sales, Russia is similar to France, Germany, Italy or Spain- countries that have 
fully developed domestic markets and whose music is not intended for export. The 
presence of significant Russian communities, however, could have an impact on the 
international scene through absorbing ideas in their new homes.
166
 According to the 
International Federations of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) Digital Music Report 
2013
167
, Russia is placed under the emerging markets and having vast potential. Russia, 
currently holding the 23
rd
 position, could be a world top 10 market, if it can create an 
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effective environment for copyright enforcement.
168
 According to the report, Russia has 
an outstanding musical heritage and contemporary artists with global appeal, such as the 
rapper Timati who has topped the charts across Europe, and classical pianist Denis 
Matsuev and it also has the largest online population in Europe, albeit with relatively 
low credit card penetration and online spending.
169
 Another indicator of cultural soft 
power can be considered tourism and annual visitors. According to the world heritage 
list, Russia has a relatively high number of sights that have been included.
170
 The annual 
number of tourists since the year 2000 has been over 21 million per year.
171
  
Sport is another indicator of potential attractiveness or popularity of a country. 
According to the last Olympic profiles (2012 London and 2010 Vancouver), Russia 
ranked in the overall medals won ranking fourth in London
172
 and eleventh in 
Vancouver
173
. In terms on medals won, Russia has been rather successful and the 
upcoming winter Sochi Olympics at home are even more so emphasizing the 
importance of sports and Russia’s international image. In 2007, the Beijing Olympic 
Games took place, and then President Hu Jintao declared that China intends to increase 
its soft power by including this event in the strategy.
174
 It can be argued, that this is 
what Russia will try to do as well with the upcoming Sochi Olympic Games and is in 
fact heavily investing in up to date (Sochi is named even the pet project of president 
Putin to promote Russia in the world). Russia’s soft power can have a positive increase 
in international arena due to the large-scale investments done by the government into 
the infrastructure as well as to the overall venue to advocate for the hospitality of the 
Russian soul. An example of cultural soft power tools in the case of Europe was the 
Eurovision song contest where Russia, represented by old grannies, won a second place 
and immediately president Putin used the opportunity to express the cultural stronghold 
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that a little-known language from Udmurtia can have in order to shed positive light on 
the multi-national culture of the country.
175
 All of the above mentioned indices and data 
emphasize the importance of Russian culture in its overall image (as well as having 
positive connotation such as popularity, high ranking and availability) thus being 
compatible with the concept of soft power that treats culture as one of the sources of 
soft power. 
3.2. Russia’s values as a source of soft power 
The conceptualization of Russian political values such as sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the state are often illustrated by the resentment of NATO enlargement, 
which is seen as a hostile move towards Russia especially in its’ near abroad. The 
interference by the western countries in human rights issues are seen extremely two-
faced, as the western democracy itself is not flawless. The concept of “sovereign 
democracy”, an alternative to western type (liberal) democracy, with its own 
uncontested values, was introduced by the Kremlin ideologue Vladislav Surkov in 
2006.
176
 The importance of it lies in the fact that Russia has presented its own 
distinctive image of political values that are promoted in the region as well. Another 
concept used in Russia, is the underlying fact of multi-polar world that denies US 
monopoly in the world order and strives for balance. The West spreading its values 
(also with NATO interventions as spreading democratic values) has been contested by 
Russia, the latter being labeled as the other or an outcast.
177
 A geo-political value can be 
seen in the Post-soviet states that are classified as Russia’s “near abroad” since 1990’s 
and Putin has referred to it as Russia’s “sphere of influence”. Policies such as the 
compatriots policy,
178
 illustrate the intense interest in the near abroad and former 
Russian diaspora in the countries.  
The concept of soft power has also emerged in political discourse. For example, Putin 
observed the increased use of soft power, which “implies a matrix of tools and methods 
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to reach foreign policy goals without the use of arms but by exerting information and 
other levers of influence.”179 However, the activities of “pseudo-NGOs”180 and other 
agencies that try to “destabilize” Russia with outside support are treated as 
unacceptable. A note on common values is stated in the 2013 foreign policy concept: “A 
true consolidation of efforts of the international community requires a set of common 
values as a foundation for joint action, a common moral denominator, which major 
world religions have always shared, including such principles and concepts as pursuit 
of peace and justice, dignity, freedom and responsibility, honesty, compassion, and 
work ethic.”181 Here, a set of values that cannot only be related to political values are 
listed, such as religion and other universal values. Hence, while the main emphasis of 
values are the ones of political nature, one can distinguish the importance of values of 
other nature as well, making the value dimension extremely diverse. What is more, the 
perception of such values bares importance in assessing their impact. Notably, the 
“clash of values” is also introduced in the 2013 foreign policy concept: “For the first 
time in modern history, global competition takes place on a civilizational level, whereby 
various values and models of development based on the universal principles of 
democracy and market economy start to clash and compete against each other. Cultural 
and civilizational diversity of the world becomes more and more manifest.”182 
According to Pew Research Global Attitudes Project opinion of Russia, polls from 2007 
to 2012 (2008 is not available) show that Russians themselves think the highest of their 
country (above 80% of the people are favourable).
183
 A more clear understanding of the 
more unique Russian values comes out in the questions on good democratic form of 
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government versus strong leader
184
 and good democracy versus strong economy
185
 as 
well as confidence in Putin
186
. According to these polls (most of them having a 
continued answer since 2005), strong leader and confidence in Putin (which has a 
decreasing trend starting from 2007; 69% of the polled people in Russia had confidence 
in Putin in 2012) are more important than good democracy or democratic form of 
government (around 30% of the people have been in favour of democratic form of 
government). This can be explained by the national identity and historic development of 
the country that has led to particular kind of values.  
According to the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators
187
 (from 2000 to 
2011), Russia has generally improved its governance score in all indicators accept for 
voice and accountability that is related to citizen freedom and an extremely low score 
(and even worsened score) in control of corruption
188
. The same indicators for 
Moldova
189
 and Armenia
190
 are relatively higher. The comparing of Russian, Moldovan 
and Armenian rankings gives context to the realities of current situation in Russia as 
well as target countries. The Global Competitiveness Index that consists of 12 pillars, 
places Russia in its 2012-2013
191
 report 67
th
, Armenia is ranked 82
nd
 and Moldova 87
th
. 
It is notable that each country is in a different stage of development; while Moldova is 
factor driven and Armenia is efficiency driven, Russia is in transition for being 
innovation driven
192
.  
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According to the United Nations Human Development Index, Russia ranks 55
th
 
according to the latest results
193
 compared to Moldova, who ranks 113
th194
 and Armenia, 
who ranks 87
th195
 out of 187 countries. With this, an example of relatively higher living 
standard is measured, which can have a positive influence on Russia’s perception in the 
given countries. Of course, there are several indicators that suggest more negative/other 
trends such as the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties survey, where 
Russia is considered a non free state, whereas Armenia and Moldova are considered 
partially free.
196
 The 2012 Democracy index by the Economist
197
 also places Moldova 
(ranked 67
th
) and Armenia (ranked 116
th
) higher than Russia (ranked 122
nd
). However, 
this might not represent the pillars of values introduced in the theory. According to Soft 
Power Index government sub index metrics“….The ‘political’ pillar of soft power is 
inherently biased towards Western ideals of government and democracy. As a result, 
non-democratic countries face an immediate disadvantage in any assessment of relative 
soft power”.198 
If to rely on more indices of attractiveness, Nobel Prize winners (given criteria are born 
in Russia, Soviet Union, Russian Empire and USSR now Russia), Russian scientists 
have won 24 times different Nobel Prize types including physics, chemistry, literature 
and more, including the peace prize.
199
 The Times Higher Education World University 
Rankings 2012-2013 table introduces the fact that, among 400 top Universities, 2 
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Russian Universities are present
200
 and one of them (Lomonosov Moscow State 
University) is also in the top 100 (ranked 50) in the Times Higher Education World 
Reputation Rankings, that employ the world's largest academic opinion survey to 
provide a list of the top 100 most powerful global university brands.
201
 Although the 
quantity is poor, there are again a number of reasons why the rankings have been also 
criticized. However, this does not mean that Russian universities would rank higher and 
that students would be more attracted to go to study to Russia. On the other hand, to get 
a more accurate overview of the situations, global attractiveness might vary compared 
to the regional attractiveness. For this, the number of foreign students in the country is 
explored. According to the Russian Federal Statistics Service, the enrolment of foreign 
students in public and municipal higher educational institutions since 2000/2001 to 
2011/2012 has doubled (current numbers being 126 319 students in total). In 
2011/2012, the total number of Armenian students was 2067 and Moldovan students 
1701, both increasing since 2000/2001.
202
 An index that shows the attractiveness 
potential for research and academic world is the Global Go To think tanks index
203
, 
according to which Russia has a total of 112 think tanks and ranks 8
th
 in the world in the 
2011 report and has two Think Tanks among the top 30 list in the world. Also, it is 
highly represented in the regional think tanks rankings.  
The author has now shown that various indices, and Nye’s initial model of soft power in 
the case of US, use to describe a countries’ soft power mostly via democratic/non-
democratic governance. The fact is that a country can still possess significant leverage 
without being western type democracy. For example, in the case of China, there is no 
doubt it has significant soft power, and the soft power index shows more leverage in 
culture and education. As a result, if to take into account values as something more than 
a countries democratic performance, one gets a set of values that are more closely 
linked to the country in questions and consequently its potential soft power. Hence, the 
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case studies intend to find out the core values that represent Russia vis-à-vis its soft 
power in the given countries. 
3.3. Russia’s foreign policy as a source of soft power 
 
According to Nye, soft power depends in part on how one frames’ its objects. Policies 
based on broadly inclusive and far-sighted definitions of the national interest are easier 
to make attractive to others than policies that take a narrow and myopic perspective.
204
 
There have been three foreign policy concepts published: in the year 2000, 2008 and 
2013. The Russian foreign policy concept published in 2000 emphasized the need to 
ensure reliable security of the country
205
, warned against the dangers of globalization, 
both political and economic; the concepts also reasserted Russia’s role as a great power, 
belonging to various institutions and its’ newly acquired status as a member of G8 put 
forward as a means for Russia to advance its foreign political interests.
206
 In 2008, the 
foreign policy concept introduced under President Medvedev, concentrated on 
modernization and Russia’s integration to the world economy.207 The foreign policy 
concept also underlined the importance of compatriots living abroad and that there is a 
special interest zone of interest, and Russia intends to expand the relationship with its 
close neighbours.
208
 With this, soft power tools were introduced already in the previous 
concepts. Soft power as a “comprehensive toolkit” was introduced by Putin in his 
political statements during presidential elections in spring 2012.
209
 After his re-election 
in 2012, Putin issued a decree “On measures of implementing foreign policy agenda of 
the Russian Federation”210, which was the basis for the 2013 Concept of the Foreign 
Policy of the Russian Federation
211
 published in February 2013. Namely, Article 20 
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provides a definition of soft power.
212
 Mostly, soft power agenda is introduced in the 
“International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights” section and the 
implementation of it in the “Regional priorities” section, where CIS countries are at the 
top of the priority area.  
According to Fyodor Lukyanov, with an intent to use soft power, Russia is moving 
towards a new identity, which is a difficult and painful process without a clear path or 
end point, but without a clear set of goals and values, soft power will be at best limited 
to a set of technical measures – not entirely useless, but ultimately ineffective.213 The 
Foreign Policy concepts’ top priority objectives214 have both hard as well as soft power 
implications. The formulations of soft power in Russia’s foreign policy concept is 
worthy of noting due to the fact that, in essence, it does not build upon Nye’s soft power 
concept. A special emphasis on the possible “destructive” elements and the “unlawful” 
use of soft power, that can be viewed in Nye’s theory mostly under the values category, 
once again emphasizing the value pillar importance in understanding Russia’s soft 
power resources and consequently how they are being utilized. As the theory is abstract, 
the case of Russia’s soft power proves to have a specific approach to soft power. Also, 
soft power is viewed as a means (toolkit) for achieving foreign policy objectives 
building on more comprehensive ground than diplomacy only.  
 
Policies 
Russia’s government actions have been lately, since Putin’s third term starting in 2012, 
called "soft authoritarianism” (with a special emphasis on domestic policies), which 
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refer to repressions and the overall repressive approach.
215
 For this, real political change 
on the part of the Russian regime is hardly considered the case: Russian system makes 
authentic reforms unattractive.
216
 Skeptics are right to note that cases like 
Khodorkovsky’s imprisonment and trial, Pussy Riot trial and punishment, gas supply 
cuts to Ukraine or price fights, and the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 are just some 
examples of undercutting soft power. Nye explicates with US and Iraq war in 2003
217
 
that although people might like the culture and values its projects, a countries policies 
may have a seriously negative impact on its soft power.  
Active NGO’s are a useful tool for a country to promote its interest in other countries. 
With Russia, recent developments in its domestic policy concerning the activity of 
foreign NGO’s in the country have been under active debate and criticism.218 
Established in 2011, office called Rossotrudnichestvo (Россотрудничества)219 is the 
main task force of soft power policies that is responsible for the relations with other 
countries, compatriots abroad and humanitarian cooperation.
220
 This agency is not an 
NGO, but acts on behalf of the country to promote its interest and NGO activities in the 
CIS countries with an emphasis on Russian language and culture.
221
 This is done 
through Russian Centers for Science and Culture in various countries all over the world, 
including Moldova and Armenia. According to the federal target programme «Russian 
Language» in 2011 — 2015, Rossotrudnichestvo is the state customer of the federal 
program since 2011.
222
 The two top objectives of the programme are supporting the 
Russian language as the basis for the development of integration processes in the CIS 
and addressing the language and cultural needs of compatriots living abroad. Also, an 
interstate program for innovation cooperation with the CIS until 2020 is listed as a 
                                                 
215
 For example, the repression consisted of attempts to punish and harass the participants of the 2012 
May protests and their leaders like Sergei Udaltsov and Alexei Navalny – and especially the adoption of 
new laws on public assemblies, NGO funding, the internet, and libel. The new law on treason has 
potentially a very broad application). 
216
 Sean Roberts, Russia's pressure politics, FIIA briefing paper, 118 (the Finnish institute of international 
affairs, December 2012). 
217
 Nye, Soft Power,p. 14. 
218
 For example, adopted law on foreign-funded NGOs engaged in any political activity, who are obliged 
to declare themselves as “foreign agents” as well as recent examples of raids of the NGO’s. 
219
 С позиции "мягко  силы" Газета "Коммерсантъ", №6 (5037), 16.01.2013 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2105575 (accessed 25 January 2013). 
220Россотрудничествo  http://rs.gov.ru/ (accessed 29 March 2013). 
221На пространстве СНГ. Россотрудничествo. http://rs.gov.ru/taxonomy/term/17 (accessed 29 March 
2013). 
222
 Russian center for science and culture in Washington, DC. http://rccusa.org/2012/07/10/1518/ 
(accessed 29 March 2013). 
 52 
priority with the CIS countires.
223
 The Agency (Rossotrudnichestvo) has put forward the 
importance of soft power and public diplomacy,
224
 emphasizing the importance and 
huge potential Russia possesses via international reputation of Russian science and 
culture, the experience of the Soviet era, infrastructure of cultural centers around the 
world, the "Russian World" - millions of people in foreign countries, who are attracted 
to Russia, Russian language and culture, and experience the human need to maintain 
ties with Russia and Russians.
225
 With this, the emphasis on the cultural attraction is 
especially strong when defining Russia’s soft power in the words of the Agency and 
policies to promote Russia. Rossotrudnichestvo carries out interaction with NGO’s such 
as the Foundation "Russian world", the Public Chamber of Russia, St. Andrew 
Foundation, Library fund "Russian abroad", the Russian Cultural Foundation, the 
International Council of Russian Compatriots, Theatre Union, the International Union 
of Museums, International Association "Twin Cities", the Moscow Union of Friendship 
Societies, St. Petersburg Association for International Co-operation etc; one of the main 
partners of the Agency is the Russian Association for International Cooperation.
226
 The 
“Russian world“ (Russkiy Mir) is a well-known establishment that aims to promote 
Russia’s culture, language and heritage in the world. It promotes its objectives via 
Russian Centers of the Russkiy Mir Foundation; in Armenia there is one center and in 
Moldova there are four, according to the list.
227
 There are also Russkiy Mir Cabinets, 
that various configurations at schools, libraries, universities, cultural centers, 
kindergartens, etc.
228
 
In relation to regional cooperation, organizations like CIS, CSTO and EurAsEc are 
involving Armenia to a greater extent than Moldova but there is also a relatively new 
regional project, Eurasian Union that is also discussed. The membership (both Armenia 
and Moldova are members of the CIS; Armenia is a member of the CSTO) or observer 
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status (EurAsEC) might have an impact on the perception of Russia as the leading 
country of these regional organizations. Yet, this is important to note due to the fact that 
the perception of EU and its influence in the region has to be taken account as well. 
Both countries are members of the European Union Neighbourhood Policy initiative, 
the Eastern Partnership (EaP). In this respect, both outlooks for the countries are put 
forward simultaneously by Russia and the EU; it is not only the case of Russia using or 
not using its soft power but it is also the question of the EU, widely referred to as a 
normative power or soft power in Europe and its neighbourhood. The EU’s influence in 
the case study countries is beyond the scope of the thesis, however, current thesis 
addresses the EU’s role in the perception of Russia’s soft power image. If to briefly 
outline one of the major differences having an impact on peoples’ everyday lives, it is 
the fact that visa freedom is provided between Russia and Armenia and Moldova, but 
not with the EU. However, there are numerous differences that can have severe impact 
on peoples’ perception and this will be determined in the next section. 
3.4. Other sources of Russia’s soft power  
 
The concept of soft power might encounter a metamorphosis à la Russia, meaning that 
in the case of Russia, the soft power introduced by Joseph Nye has a stronger presence 
of hard power resources. It has been argued that it looks to the past, mobilizing the 
memories and legacies of an imagined and real common history
229
 and in this way 
influencing the minorities especially in the Post-Soviet countries to pressure the 
government and pursue its agenda. Also, much of Russian soft power is focused on 
elites, which is the direct model of influence according to Nye. It has been argued that 
the discussion of Russian soft power today is really a discussion of foreign policy
230
 and 
as was established in the literature overview, most of policy papers deal with the 
tangible resources of power or emphasize very specific carrots that Russia benefits 
from. For example, Russia is the major supplier of natural gas and Moscow links the 
commercial operations of its energy exports to its political aims; cheap gas in exchange 
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for control of a countries energy infrastructure or non-economic demands.
231
 In 
literature, Russia’s soft power is mainly regarded as rhetoric of fraternity, multilateral 
institutions with membership benefits, strategic investment, visa-free regime and open 
labour market, authoritarian regime support, alternative model, religion, media 
control.
232
 Hard power is regarded to have two main sources: energy dependence (and 
infrastructure ownership and energy prices) and military presence. Related to these are 
the hard sticks of embargos on gas and other products. 
233
 What is more, Russia’s soft 
power is missing the normative dimension that supports its goals.
234
 Thus, in the case of 
Russia, hard and soft power interconnectedness is a crucial element in evaluating its 
attractiveness. While certain power resources can enhance its soft power image, they 
can also undermine it, making the difference of power conversion and what constitutes 
as soft and hard power difficult to separate from each other. Instead, the thesis examines 
the perception of various elements of Russia’s image that build its soft power. Although 
the theory based soft power resources at this point are introduced, in order to proceed, 
the image of Russia’s soft power will put the resources into perspective. This is done 
via analysis of the specific question introduced to the interviewees: How would you 
define Russia’s soft power?  
One of the interviewee
235
 said that soft power is based on communication with your 
partners and the social environment is as important as the message itself. The issue of 
communication is something that Russia seems to be uninterested and hence the essence 
of soft power is misunderstood.
236
 As the interviewee noted, one cannot just impose its 
ideas
237
- they first have to be understandable, acceptable (and legitimate) and fit into the 
social environment. Referring to the latest foreign policy concept, the interviewee said 
the following: “The problem with soft power is that it can never be legally fixed (…)”238 
and, paradoxically, Russia reproduces the most stereotypical images against which 
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Russia itself complains. One of the outcomes of this type of behviour is that as long as 
Russia does not “modernize” its soft power, it will not have much leverage in the 
societies further away from the country. Nye in this respect hasn’t explicitly addressed 
the issue of “outdated” view of soft power, but he refers that the information age is 
having an increasing impact on countries’ interaction and power behaviour.  
Another fundamental difference is the fact that criticizing the West for not 
understanding Russia is not only the problem of the West but also Russia itself. 
Different world views as such, and China is a case in point, does not mean that soft 
power cannot work in an engaging way. The lack of communication tools that are 
attractive come from the fact that Russia is not interested in promoting itself to more 
people than the ones who speak the language (as the main export tool of soft power) and 
share the views. Of course, one could ask if a global like (as one of the interviewee 
explicated soft power) image is something that Russia really wants. However, soft 
power in essence is attractiveness and this is manifested as a goal in Russia’s foreign 
policy concept as well as current political discourse.  
The main tool that Russia uses is language and this has been put forward as the basis for 
the NGO activities. Also, from a foreign policy point of view, Russia is in a position 
where it does not “do” as much as the EU for soft power, and if it fails (the EU soft 
power sometimes has been criticized for not having any carrot in the near future for the 
EaP countries), while affiliation with Russia is made as easy as possible, the EU faces 
difficulties. With regards to how capable is Russia using its soft power resources, some 
of the interviewees mentioned Russia as a smart user of its resources, while others 
dismissed its capability. However, the interviewees did not question the vast potential of 
the soft power resources the country possesses. Some of the interviewees said that 
Russia’s soft power is derived from the Orange Revolution and their particular analysis 
of what happened in Ukraine. As one interviewee noted, that’s when they started to put 
their money into political technology that was trying to imitate what the western NGO’s 
do, but in their specific, controlled way, what is in fact the fundamental 
misunderstanding, as one interviewee noted.
239
 As was established in the literature 
overview, currently, Russia’s soft power model is relying on the western type of soft 
power promotion in its own unique context and social environment. 
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The source of Russia’s soft power was addressed in the following way:“(…) Russia’s 
soft power is much more rooted in direct experience of people with Russia (…) or 
relatives or friends experience with the country.”240Another interviewee emphasized the 
importance of how soft power can be used: “Soft power is not something you are it’s 
something you have, especially vis-à-vis Russia,”241 which falls in line with the agent-
centric view of soft power, that is the dominant soft power “paradigm” in Russia. 
According to another interviewee: “(…) power is power in this Kremlin world-view. 
Which again is not true, because they have sticks and carrots in the same hand. (…) the 
carrot is often undermined by the stick. Plus, it’s all transactional.”242 
When asked about the future of Russia’s soft power, one interviewee described that 
Russia cannot secure its border and it is non-defendable in that sense, which explains 
the policies: “(…) when someone says Russia is trying to buy everyone by subsidizing 
cheap gas, well partly yes, but partly this is their own security concern. (…) but what 
they ended up with is that they basically subsidized the pension systems in Belarus, 
social security networks in countries like Armenia and so one and I think that 
realization has come with a huge cost without getting anything in return (…)”243 This is 
also what was mentioned by another interviewee; the fact that Russia actually is unable 
to “ use” its so called allies when needed and in this regards, the elite is not so strong to 
control the other states as they would like to.
244
  Military presence was named essential 
in maintaining its influence as well as gas and transit fees. Several interviewees also 
brought out the point that Russia is not dealing with its present issues especially the 
ethnic diversity as well as demographic decline, rather, it is still focusing on its history 
and the legacy that has no real connection to the reality Russia faces today. The lack of 
clear approach was also the factor, which the interviewees brought out. “I think Russia 
has a huge gap between the potential for realization of soft power and concrete forms of 
these realization.”245 The fact that people speak the language does not mean that they 
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want to re-emigrate to Russia, and it is even not the case in Armenia, which is a mono-
ethnic country.
246
  
In sum, the lack of strategy and concrete tools is the main obstacle in achieving the 
goals, and it is the problem of weak state institutions as a whole. Russia does not have 
the working and effective institutions, maybe even the know-how on how to conduct the 
soft power policy. According to one interviewee, an important factor that is not taken 
into account by Russia, is that in small countries, even not “serious” publications or 
emotional approach on sensitive issues are having a substantial effect in the society,
247
 
which in turn can have a negative impact on Russia’s image. The particularity of 
perception and how the strategy is presented is extremely important in building image. 
The mode of how Russia’s soft power is understood is very much embedded in the stick 
and carrot method; however, the essence of soft power is attractiveness, which cannot 
be the subject of one-way model, but depends on the subjects’ perception as well. 
Russia uses its soft power resources to control the region, yet the very essence of soft 
power is above control, one cannot control the perception as well as attractiveness by 
imposing more soft power resources in a controlled way. The image of a country that 
uses soft power in a way that is controlled and even censored, also indicating that soft 
power can only be legitimate when it is restricted by laws, is not how soft power 
resources can work in a beneficial way for the country. Soft power is not only about the 
resources and money spent to promote its culture, especially language, as it is in the 
case of Russia, but it is about living up to the standards a country imposes on others the 
same way it deals with the issues at home. When a country tries to control foreign 
activity at home and at the same time promote its interest with the same or similar 
activities, a contradiction of what a country says and does appears. According to Nye, 
soft power has to be perceived as being legitimate. In some cases this is proven to work, 
when Russia emphasizes values different of the West and other times it fails, by 
indicating some pragmatic or special interest, soft power is undermined. 
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4. CASE STUDIES 
4.1.  Russia’s soft power in Moldova and Armenia 
 
Background 
Moldova is geographically a key state that serves as one of two overland routes 
connecting Eastern and Western Europe. If to turn to Russia’s immediate influence in 
Moldova, it holds a firm control of Moldova's breakaway province of Transnistria. 
Moldova depends entirely on Russia for natural gas supplies. Russia is Moldova's most 
important trade partner and according to the State Chamber of Registration, 812 
companies with Russian capital operate in Moldova
248
 being also a key market for 
Moldovan goods. Recent developments like assigning Dimitri Rogozin as a special 
representative in Transnistria or assigning the new ambassador Farit Mukhametshin in 
Chisinau, who had previously headed the Rossotrudnichestvo
249
 is regarded as Russia 
having special interest in the country.  
Armenia's is also an important country considering the geography. It splits Turkey and 
Azerbaijan and also partially seals off Iran's influence in the Caucasus. Armenia is 
considered deeply interrelated to Russia and its sphere of influence. Today, its economy 
relies heavily on Russia. The Russian military stationed in the country is there to 
prevent potential hostility with Azerbaijan and at the same time to guard the border with 
Turkey. Russia is also mediating the issue of the disputed breakaway region of 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia is by far Armenia's strongest ally in the region
250
 and the 
two countries are named strategic allies. Since the 1990’s, a large number of Armenians 
have permanently emigrated from Armenia and joined the sizeable Armenian Diaspora 
in Russia, Ukraine, USA and countries of Western and Eastern Europe.
251
. Russians 
make up a very small percentage (up to 0.5 %) of Armenia's population, but Russia has 
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one of the largest Armenian diasporas in the world, numbering around 1.5-2,5 million. 
Russia also essentially owns all of the strategic energy, rail and telecommunications 
assets (among many others) in Armenia. According to the EaP country overview, 
Russia is the main investor and Russian capital mostly controls Armenia’s key economy 
sectors as well as supplies of energy to Armenia.
252
 
4.1.1. Main results: culture 
According to the interviewees, Russia’s cultural presence is strong in both countries. 
This is especially evident in schools where Russian language is the main language. 
Cultural output and the interconnectedness was many times illustrated by the cultural 
exchange projects related to pop culture, the role of music was also emphasized 
(Jurmala song contest or Slavianski Bazaar was named very popular among musicians). 
High culture was mostly related to writers and classical music, which had an extremely 
positive connotation. One interviewee expressed that Russia should promote the 
availability of new Russian literature (for example in Nagorno-Karabakh) because the 
literature is not updated and soft power leverage is lost.
253
 In Armenia, due to the fact 
that pop culture is also popular among the youth, pop culture plays much more 
significant role. Overall, the interviewees named different cultural icons (both historic 
and present time) and maintained that the icons or stars of today do have popularity. 
When asked the interviewees to name Russian brands (any kind of brand they could 
think of) that create some image of Russia and have either positive or negative 
connotations, the results were diverse. Firstly, the interviewer did not detect any major 
differences when it came to naming brands by interviewees who answered about only 
one or the other country, however there were country specific issues. For instance, in 
the case of Moldova, Rospotrebnadzor (department that controls the quality of wine) 
had very negative connotations due to foreign policy events. In the case of Armenia, 
Armrosgazprom as well as Russian electricity grid (United Energy Systems) were 
named with no specific (emotional) connotation. If to further address the issue of 
connotations, the perception of Russian brands were perceived as having less impact in 
Moldova than in Armenia. The most popular answer
254
 was Gazprom and secondly 
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Putin or Putinism. Gazprom was related to energy supply but was not related to negative 
perceptions in an obvious way and the brand was even named as the formal soft power 
exporter sponsoring large scale projects or sports like football. When answering about 
Armenia, more emphasis was put on Russia’s role in the energy sector because the gas 
is cheap but on the other hand, the fear of gas prices elevating is also present. “Brand” 
Putin was related to the region, where some people aspire to become a leader like him 
or he is perceived more as an authoritarian, but he is known very well. Patriarch of the 
Orthodox Church was also regarded as an important institution of Russia and the 
Eurasian Union as the “next possible brand” was also named.255  
There were more specific example about Russia’s brands in Armenia than in Moldova. 
For example, network provided by Russia such as beeline and MTS, banking sector, the 
capital of Russia and internet sites like Odnoklassniki, were named. Food products were 
more often mentioned to be a brand or something you can see in Armenia than in 
Moldova, yet this is explained by Armenia’s weaker position in trading for example 
with the EU. With relation to Armenia, one interviewee noted: “Russia is 
everywhere”256. The “obvious” brands like Vodka, Kalashnikov, Balalaika were named, 
but there are not so many Russian brands that people consider to be known, except for 
Gazprom.
257
 At this point, the author notes that Gazprom as a brand could be very 
influential in terms of positive PR, due to the fact that it is very well known and visible. 
As long as it is related to government action, cutting off supply, unpredictable prices, 
Russia does not have any significant leverage with the brand and positive connotation.  
 
Moldova 
According to the latest available public opinion survey in Moldova, TV is the most 
popular media outlet (first source of information for 88% of the surveyed and most 
trusted media outlet as well- 67%).
258
 However, the importance of it is the fact that 
Prime TV, which is the rebroadcast of the Russian Channel One (previously ORT) 
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remains the most popular source of information, (49,4%) followed by Moldovan state 
TV channel Moldova 1 (45,6) and leads also the “most objective” TV source board 
(50,4%) followed by Moldova 1.
259
 The popularity of Russian media channels are also 
confirmed by the interviewees, furthermore, the importance of media and Russian 
language exposure is significant in peoples’ everyday lives: “Russian films and serials 
are very popular in Moldova, while the Hollywood movies most often are viewed in 
Russian translation. For example, all movie theaters in Chisinau except for one show 
movies translated into Russian.”260 However, some of the interviewees said that the 
exposure to Russian media has more influence among the Russian ethnic minority than 
among the ethnic Moldovans and Romanians and this is what seriously minimizes 
Russian influence.
261
 When asked about media’s role in formulating people’s opinion, 
one interviewee talked about the bias that the Russian TV channels can produce: “(…)it 
does create an image of (…) neighbouring countries that is not exactly 
correct…because there are missions or certain issues distorted and some things are not 
mentioned, so I would say yes it is biased, as stated before-author and it is used as a 
tool.” 262  
Several times the issue of minorities and language was raised. The lack of willingness to 
know the official language in Moldova was emphasized and because a lot of people talk 
Russian, it is the second language of communication. What is more, all of the 
interviewees (answering about Moldova) had experiences when Russian language was 
more easy to use than any other language and as one interviewee summed it up: “…and 
with Russian people, it is the only language of communication.”263 Russian language 
and minorities throughout the region have an important role in Russia’s soft power and 
according to one interviewee, people do not need to identify themselves as Russians, but 
identifying themselves as Russian speaking citizens is enough for Russia to have a soft 
power tool.
264
 However, the very fact that language is used as the primary tool to 
promote Russia shows the one-sidedness of the approach as well as the danger of being 
dismissed due to negative connotations. This is evident in Moldova, where several 
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interviewees had personal experience of people not wanting to talk in Russian, even 
though they know the language. Cases when Russia uses this “leverage” to pressure 
other governments, can actually undermine the soft power tool of language.
265
  
 
Armenia 
In Armenia, 90% of people consider the most important information source TV.
266
 The 
three most viewed TV channels in 2011 survey were H1, Armenia TV and Shanti TV 
and Armenian channels are most often used for everyday information (87%) and 
Russian channels come second (51%). According to the survey and a study published in 
2011, the Russian TV news popularity was almost half (49%) among the people 
watching Russian stations for news daily.
267
 An interesting finding in the 2011 report 
was that the contents of the TV programs of Armenian and Russian are based on 
American or European shows (that are also available in translation) and that viewers felt 
that Russian soap operas were of the highest quality.
268
 The Russian site Odnoklassniki 
is by far the most popular social network (80%) compared to Facebook (15%).
269
 When 
it comes to Media, the Russian TV channels are available such as Channel One, RTR, 
NTV, RenTV, TNT. Several interviewees mentioned that the channel Kultura is the 
main cultural soft powers provider when to talk about Russia. When it comes to other 
channels, for example TNT, humor shows (KVN) are also popular. In Armenia, the 
language presence and knowledge is perceived much more positively. “The knowledge 
of Armenian and Russian in history was taken so called by default.”270 In relation to 
Armenia, the fact that during Soviet time elite schools were Russian and people tried to 
get their children to Russian schools played an important role if formulating peoples’ 
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opinion. As regards the cultural influence but also influence per se, one interviewee 
brought out the fact that any kind of influence coming from Russia is not contested as it 
is in the case of some other countries (for example Estonia) and when it comes to 
language, the interviewee also thought it was an integral part of the country (Armenia), 
and the image of youth not speaking Russian that well is not that evident, when talking 
about personal experience.
271
 The language also plays an important role due to the fact 
that it is mandatory in schools and this has an influence on the cultural ties. The 
interviewees noted about Armenia that the knowledge of Russian gives significant 
leverage for Armenians themselves and in this respect, any language (English and 
French are also popular to know and learn) is useful and the tool of knowledge of the 
language actually benefits both countries societies. With regards to pop culture, there 
are many artists coming to Armenia and they are popular, but classical music is also 
widely listened to. Several interviewees mentioned the cultural exchange years between 
Russia and Armenia as a significant cultural event enhancing Russia’s soft power 
levarage. 
 
4.1.2. Main results: Values 
With both countries, the Soviet time is not seen as something very bad, because the life-
standard was much higher during Soviet time for the majority of people and this is what 
is remembered. Although current thesis addressed the issue of Soviet time in the context 
of culture, the analysis of the interviews showed that the Soviet time experience (and 
common history) was perceived mainly in the socio-economic standards of living. 
Soviet nostalgia was treated as a common value of a certain age group and was not 
regarded as a source of the cultural affinity. The interviewees stressed the fact that in 
terms of universal values, the countries (Russia, Moldova and Armenia) are not so 
different. The shared values were often emphasized by the fact that the region shares a 
common history and there were values such as the preference of strong or paternalistic 
state, especially when it comes to economy and social affair, meaning that liberal 
economic model does not look very appealing. “State as the care-taker, rather than 
liberal-enabler,”272 was seen as a shared value. According to one interviewee, Russia 
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tries to use the concept of conservatism (indicating to traditional European values that 
Europe itself has deviated from) to replace the previous technocratic approach.
273
 
Another interviewee noted that when it comes to “shared values” it is “the „values” of 
this pseudo-civilization of transition which we call "Post-Soviet".
274
 The issue of 
political values was explicated as follows: “The more westernized a country becomes, 
the more critical it becomes about Russia,”275 the interviewee stated that countries that 
are more Western oriented, such as Moldova, become more sensitive towards Russia’s 
policies at home and this is the underlying factor why soft power in Moldova does not 
work so well- different understanding of values and what a country promotes with its 
domestic policy either finds praise or criticism. Overall, the image of shared values had 
different connotations with different countries and connected more Russia and Armenia 
than Russia and Moldova. However, religion and church was a common denominator of 
Russia and Moldova. In Armenia, 98% of the population is considered to be members 
of the Armenian Apostolic Church
276
 but in Moldova, an estimated 75% of Moldovans 
belong to the Moldovan Orthodox Church, which is an autonomous church under the 
Russian Orthodox Church.
277
 
 
Moldova 
The Soviet time cultural nostalgia was more related to the unpleasant memory of 
Russification. However, it had an impact on values and holidays or what people watch 
on TV (Russian films for example).
278
 One interviewee named the politicians rather 
career oriented than having seriously nostalgic views about the Soviet Union.
279
 All of 
the interviewees agreed that cultural nostalgia, if at all present, belongs to the older 
generation. According to the interviewees, the value gap is having political influence 
and is used by different parties and thus the election can be swung with different value 
oriented debates. One interviewee saw no interconnectedness in terms of shared values 
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indicating to loose or non-existing Slavic ties.
280
 One of the shared values that was 
named by several interviewees was religion and Orthodox church and the fact that the 
Moldovan Orthodox Church is under the Russian Orthodox Church (jurisdiction of the 
Moscow Patriarchate) also, the old calendar of religious holidays is used.
281
 The 
importance of religion and the role it play’s was exemplified by one interviewee282 
about the segregation of the church, namely, the issue of Metropolitan of Bessarabia, 
which is under Romania, was accused by Russia in interference into the political life of 
Moldova during the dispute with the Russian Orthodox Church over the territorial 
jurisdiction. 
According to the opinion polls, the EU scores on a “good” scale up to 75 % and 67% of 
people felt that the relations with Russia are good.
283
 54% of the people would vote for 
EU integration, if a referendum would take place, however, 55% of the people surveyed 
would vote for the accession of Moldova to the Customs Union, and if the people ought 
to choose, a slight advantage for the Customs Union is apparent.
284
 Another Russian 
favoured example is the trust in political leaders of other countries, where Mr Vladimir 
Putin is regarded as the most trusted politician, 75% of people answer the question with 
very much trust or some trust.
285
 With this, although EU integration is under active 
consideration, the Customs Union, Vladimir Putin and Russian media outlet are leading 
the popularity rankings under their categories. According to the interviewees, in the 
case of Moldova, Russian leaders are not seen very positive, rather, there is some 
distrust in how they are leading the country and authoritarianism was used to describe 
Russia’s leadership several times. According to the interviewees, even though Russian 
leaders actions are viewed with great reservation, Moldova is striving for neutrality and 
does not want to condemn Russia’s policies openly, however, paradoxically, some 
Moldovan political leaders try to imitate the Russian politicians and one interviewee 
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brought an example “Lately, many politicians in the Republic of Moldova began to wear 
the watch on the right hand like Vladimir Putin.”286 
 
Armenia 
In Armenia, the socio-economic system of Soviet time (similarly to Moldova) was 
named as something that the generation longs for. One interviewee noted that the Soviet 
time cultural influence is indeed visible in Armenia, but whether it influences the image 
of Russia, was hard to say, due to the fact that Russia is firstly seen as the security 
guarantor.
287
 At the same time, film classics and even Soviet time singers are very 
popular in Armenia. The political discourse is dominated by nationalistic discourse
288
 
and the policy of complementarism, seeking to have good relations with its friendly 
neighbours and international organizations. One interviewee noted the importance of 
differences in various paths that the Post-Soviet states took explaining that the historic 
development of Armenia and the time under the Russian empire is perceived as a 
positive time in history due to the fact that the nation started flourishing and to some 
extent freedom to evolve.
289
 Overall, a positive view on the common history was named 
by a few interviewees as an important factor in shaping the views about Russia.  
The interviewees indicated different views about the same values and how some are 
more emphasized than others such as conservatism or paternalism,
290
 meaning that 
shared values in terms of the two countries do have a significant impact on how Russia 
is perceived. There was a definite differentiation between western liberal values and the 
ones Russia and Armenia share. The value of family, religion, spiritual values
291
 and 
traditional values were most appreciated and commonly named. According to one 
interviewee, in the case of Russia, values such as patriotism or religion are often 
interpreted in their extreme, conservative values, nationalism becoming also more 
prominent.
292
 One interviewee also mentioned the case of Pussy Riot and expressed 
that, most probably, if something like that were to happen in the west, the reaction 
would not be so radical but from the viewpoint of Armenian values, the role of religion 
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is very important and hence the reaction of Russia is understandable.
293
 The interviews 
established a number of similar value views, but there was a difference in how they 
were perceived. According to the interviewees, and they all held the same positions, 
Armenians are somewhat more committed to their values, especially concerning family 
and religion, also history played an important role in formulating the values. Even 
though Russian values were regarded as very similar, there were views about somewhat 
looser ties to morality by some interviewees. What is more, the western liberal values 
did raise some concern and were seen as something unacceptable.  
In the case of Armenia, a more comprehensive overview of public opinion can be found 
since 2008, when relations with Russia were found good in total of 98% and with the 
EU 84% and Russia was by far the most important partner for the country (95%, 
whereas EU came after France and Iran with 29%). 51% of the surveyed though that 
Armenia should stay with CIS and 30% that Armenia should join the EU.
294
 According 
to one interviewee, Putin has a positive image in Armenia and the way he managed the 
country through hard times. “I would even say that, to some extent, Armenia would like 
to have such Putin of their own (…) I think in the case of Russia or Armenia, a need for 
strong leader still exists.”295 Another interviewee used the term self-evident when 
explaining Russia’s influence in Armenia in different aspects meaning that for example 
the leaderships outspoken behaviour hardly irritates the majority of people in Armenia 
as it does in some countries.  
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 Russia the EU and the “shared neighbourhood”296 
The issue of Russia and the EU in the region was emphasized regarding the importance 
of the results of the upcoming Vilnius summit of EaP and its effect on the prospect of 
future EU Integration. “I think that the problem is with the decrease of the EU’s soft 
power, just because the EU is so much less impressive, so the bigger problem is not 
Russia’s soft power but EU’s self-inflicted crisis.”297 In the case of Armenia, the 
situation was viewed from a different angle: “The thing is that Russia is there already. 
It is the EU that’s the alternative.”298 The interviewees also said that people are having 
hard time to see, what the EU is really offering; yet what it demands from the country is 
much more visible. The question of Ramil Safarov
299
 was brought as an example to 
explain the EU’s inability to work as a unifying actor. The interviewees did not see 
Russia being used as an alternative for EU integration in the political discourse (in 
Moldova or Armenia). According to some of the interviewees, the “era” of sovereign 
democracy dates back to few years ago and has seriously lost its position in today’s 
political discourse, since the region is not “boiling”, referring to the colour revolutions. 
“It was at that time when Russia tried to strike back with its own vision.“300 According 
to the interviewees (international experts in particular) the concept of sovereign 
democracy is not something that is used anymore, “(…) Paradoxically, the West doing 
less democracy promotion, is better for the dictators in the region and there is no need 
to fall back on sovereign democracy.”301 Another interesting point about Russia’s 
model and the attractiveness was the following: “It seems to me often times that it is 
actually Putin learning from long-standing dictators like Lukashenko or 
Nazarbajev.”302  
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This is not the case of soft power, but there is a clear distinction between elite model 
and society, which is also introduced in Nye’s theory. The impression of Russia’s socio-
economic standards
303
 was regarded as appealing to the target countries society. Some 
ultra liberal views exported by the West were also seen as enhancing Russia’s 
conservative views. In Armenia, the interviewees saw Russia’s interest in the country 
differently, but all of them confirmed that Russia has its own geo-political interests in 
the region. However, Russia as the security guarantor was the most important thing that 
was singled out as the purpose of Russia in Armenia. In this view, the perception of 
Russia’s presence in the country is viewed as needed, whereas in Moldova, it is seen as 
something causing problems. One interviewee explained the ultimate alternative for 
ordinary people as low energy prices or visa free travel to Europe.
304
 
The perception of Russia’s concepts and the issue of protection of compatriots has been 
the subject of some political discourse in Moldova and the concept of sphere of 
influence is related to Transnistria and the special representative Rogozin. Russia has 
granted approximately 160,000 citizenships to Transnistrian residents and that is why it 
increasingly justifies its actions in this secessionist region. The legitimacy of Russian 
political discourse and their values are also influenced by how successful they are in 
other spheres of society. For example, as on interviewee named, the business and 
economic ties play an important role on how Russia’s influence is perceived and 
whether it is seen as something legitimate or not.
305
 Several interviewees mentioned that 
one of the prevalent issues is economy and how the society manages, hence leaving 
values and culture on the background.  
In Armenia, Russia’s actions are perceived as legitimate and there is nothing that is 
contested. But Armenians do have a problem with Russia’s raising nationalism and the 
interviewees brought out some incidents when Armenians were attacked in Russia, 
which definitely have a negative impact, nevertheless, it does not discredit the Russian 
image as a whole. The issue of whether to join the EU or the Eurasian Union was 
brought up by the interviewees and the latter was evaluated as something not so 
complicated. Armenian leaders have not denied the option of EU integration and it is in 
fact a priority, but this is not against Russia. Russia remains in a military-political 
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relations with Armenia and this is something far more important, as some of the 
interviewees noted.  As long as Russia remains the guarantor of Armenian security, the 
EU has some leverage, while the Eurasian Union is an abstract object. Although Russia 
plays an important role, the interviewees brought out a more diversified picture of 
Armenia’s options: “I think that we have the unique possibility of building a pro-
Armenian country.”306  The same was emphasized about Moldova, that the country has 
its own agenda and dividing the countries under Russian or the EU’s influence is not 
what the case studies in question strive for. 
4.1.3. Main results: Foreign Policy 
 
Migration 
The last section on foreign policy covers a variety of issues brought up by the 
interviewees. To measure Russia’s attractiveness in terms of policies, the author first 
looks at a few statistical figures. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of the 
Republic of Moldova, emigration to Russia has drastically decreased since 2001.
307
 
However, labour force migration to Russia since 2006-2011 was around 200 thousand 
people
308, which shows the importance of Russia’s labour market and can contribute to 
the image of Russia. In the case of Armenia, labour migration to Russia is annually (in 
the 2009 report) about 60 thousand and a survey done by OSCE for the period 2002-
2005 found that almost 90% of labour migrants surveyed went to Russia.
309
 Migrants do 
have an effect (indirect effect of soft power) in how countries are seen and perceived. 
Some of the interviewees mentioned the relative travel ease and visa free movement and 
also Russian language as a common denominator. “The reservations towards the EU, 
giving credit automatically to Russia, are related to the uncertainty of the EU accession 
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prospects, the difficulty of visa liberalization with the EU and the uncertainty of 
European labor markets opening (to get to work to Russia, Moldovans (for now) need 
only 50 USD for the ticket) and to mistakes of the current government.”310 Also, the 
importance of people’s direct experience, as explicated in the third chapter as well, was 
singled out: “The families live in two cultural areas, women and children here 
Armenia-author, and men as a rule in Russia, and obviously, the cultural influence is 
coming from there as well (…).”311 
 
Compatriots policy 
The compatriots program was approved by the president of Russia in 2006 (with some 
amendments in 2010) for a continuous period until 2012 in order to stabilize Russia’s 
population, especially in regions of strategic importance for the country.
312
 In general, 
applicants must speak Russian and be comfortable with the country’s society and 
culture.
313
 The number of compatriots who moved to Russia in 2007 was 682 compared 
with the target of 23,000 for 2007. In 2008, 3,000 compatriots returned to Russia. By 
2009, about 10,000 people had taken advantage of the repatriation program. The Deputy 
Chief of the Russian Ministry for Regional Development stated that by 2010, 23,000 
Russians had moved back to Russia using the state repatriation program.
314
 The 
program was first launched in Armenia in 2009 and during the past four years the 
program had a total of 26,000 applicants, of whom 1,500 have given up their Armenian 
citizenship and moved to live in Russia.
315
 Nearly 10 percent of the participants who 
filled out questionnaires of the program in the first quarter of 2012 were residents of 
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Armenia.
316
 Despite the “merits” of the program, it has been criticized for its 
bureaucracy and ineffectiveness as well as the fact that the program is not open to just 
any descendants of Russians. Russia’s “compatriots” program with which citizens of 
post-Soviet republics are enabled to become permanent residents in remote provinces of 
the Russian Federation, is not seen as something positive, rather, the fear of further 
migration is an increasing problem and was not favoured by the Armenian 
government.
317
 The policy is an example of how soft power has been undermined by 
government action also in the case of Armenia. The intentions of these activities are not 
clear and they cause distrust and the project is seen as something that Russia uses to 
exploit the minority and shed bad light on other countries. The question arises, was the 
aim of the project to do just that or is it a problem of poor communication that created 
negative image and undermined the soft power project. Yet, the fundamental problem is 
not knowing how to use soft power in order to enhance communication and interaction 
with other countries in a way that is perceived either neutral or positive. 
 
Student exchange 
Many people got their higher education during the Soviet times from Russia and this 
was emphasized by the interviewees as having an important role in formulating people’s 
views. Also, cheaper studying conditions can also be the reason why people go studying 
to Russia. Russia awards less scholarships to Moldovans with comparison to Romania: 
“Russia awards annually about 100-200 students’ scholarships for Moldovans, usually 
granted to the young people in Transnistria, Gagauzia and those of Russian ethnics. 
Romania, on the other hand, for the academic year 2012-2013, awarded 5,000 
scholarships for Moldovan students and pupils.”318 One interviewee brought out the 
importance of student exchange and the location where they study, but even though the 
Armenians who went to study to the US, read the Russian literature and know the 
language, hence the value paradigm is an important part of soft power.
319
 Especially in 
the case of Armenia, the diasporas were noted by all of the interviewees and how they 
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have the potential to influence the image of a country via its family, friends and 
acquaintances in Armenia. In Russia, the Armenian diaspora consists of various people 
including work migrants but also people who went to live there. In terms of studying, 
Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University in Armenia was named by several 
interviewees and was something very positive in what it can offer to students. The 
University gives out Armenian and Russian diplomas at the same time. Of course, other 
influential universities that relate to the big diasporas as well are US and France. 
Increasingly, youth is looking towards the EU and the West, but it is not easy to go 
there. In the case of Moldova, the interviewees did not regard studying in Russia as 
something popular, rather, Romania and other EU countries were the primary 
destination. 
 
Russian NGO’s 
In Moldova, Russian NGO’s are not so visible, but according to the interviewees they 
are more visible in the eastern part of the country (Transnistria). Yet, it is hard to 
establish, what are the specific interests of the NGO’s. Mostly, the embassy is having 
some projects, and youth activities were most commonly named. For example, the 
Russian Center for Science and Culture was opened in Chisinau in February 2009 and 
has become very active in Moldova. One interviewee saw the NGO sponsoring similar 
to the 1990s, where the people who receive the money have not really changed, but the 
sums have risen. Russia’s NGO’s however concentrate on the minority. As one 
interviewee noted, "Russian youth league" activities are mainly attended by Russian-
speaking youth and another example is the Russian Orthodox Church and the 
"orthodox" NGO’s like "Pro-Orthodoxy", which attracts some Moldovans but not very 
many.
320
 Overall the image of NGO’s was hard to establish due to the fact that the 
interviewees had hard time naming and differentiating them and their activity. 
As regards Armenia, one interviewee noted that Russia has started to put more 
resources in opening different centers all over the world but for example in Armenia, 
out of 200 active NGO’s, only 4 are known to be Russian.321 One of them is Russkiy 
Mir, whose chairman of the board is Russian political scientist and State Duma deputy 
Viacheslav Nikonov, also in close relations with Kremlin. One interviewee explained 
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the fact that there are not many NGO’s of Russian origin due to the fact that Russia is 
extremely present anyways.
322
 On the other hand, this shows the potential of expanding 
its NGO activities in the country. Overall, Russia’s NGO’s have not actively initiated 
different projects and engaged wider public in their activities in Armenia.
323
  
 
Bilateral relations: Moldova 
Moldova and Armenia do not have a common border with Russia. The foreign policy of 
Moldova towards Russia pursues clear and friendly relations as with all the other 
countries,
324
 but “We do not want to have big brother effect.”325 It was said by three 
interviewees that the near abroad approach brings about more protest moods than 
positive connotations. Moldova is split in terms of political parties and this was named 
by some interviewees, namely that the elections can still be swung both ways, although 
the pro-European alliance is in power for now, the governmental crisis and hard times in 
Europe and economy has been a test for people’s views on pro-EU mindedness. Several 
interviewees mentioned embargo on Moldovan wine imposed by Russia as something 
that had very bad consequences for the image of Russia’s soft power. What is more, the 
interviewees said that such bans were actually beneficial for Moldova as the companies 
had to find new markets and redirect their products export. This is an illustration of a 
policy having double backfire: firstly, with the image and secondly, trading and 
economic relations.  
The issue of Transnistria and Russia using its influence through the region is extremely 
important in the two countries interaction. For example, two interviewees named the 
fact that pensions in Transnistria are paid by Russia and this has an image building 
effect. Russian presence in Transnistria is having an extremely negative image in 
Moldova. The policy that Russia uses in the case of Transnistria is counterproductive 
for Russia and does undermine the trustful relationship of the two countries. “Russia’s 
role in Transnistria influences its image very much and in the worst and most radical 
way. All of this media and other stuff is incomparable when it comes to the issue of 
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Transnistria (…).”326 Interviewees explained that people living in Transnistria are 
warned against the possibility of Moldova and Romania uniting. Another interviewee 
said that in the case of Transnistria, such Russia’s “soft power” is very successful, 
because people are afraid that unification with Moldova means they have to start 
speaking Romanian.
327
 The lack of activity in the 5+2 negotiating format (Russia, 
Ukraine, OSCE, US, EU, Chisinau, Tiraspol) from Russia is also one example of the 
continuation of the problem; maintaining the status quo is something that seems to suit 
the Russian side. Some of the interviewees also brought out the fact that Russia is 
blackmailing Moldova to pay the debt of Gazprom supplied gas on credit to the 
separatist Transnistrian region (thus ensuring its existence). However, the fact that 
Gazprom wants its money cannot be threatened by means of cutting of supply, because 
in essence that would mean leaving the separatist region without “the same hand that 
feeds them”. With this, it is actually the case of Russia having trapped itself in. Overall, 
all of the interviewees indicated Transnistria as the most important problem facing the 
two countries’ relations. Two interviewees referred to the incident of one Moldovan 
killed by a Russian peacekeeping soldier at the border checkpoint but there is no final 
court decision and Moldovan authorities do not even have a full overview of what 
happened. Russia can sometimes be interpreted as irrational actor because it is not 
understandable what it stands for in Transnistria.  The issue of territorial integrity versus 
supporting separatists is undermining the foundation of a trustful relationship. Also, 
Russia’s military presence was defined as illegal “There is two kinds of Russian 
military presence in Moldova. One is legal- and it’s called Russian peacekeeping forces 
(…). But we have the second- and this is called the remains of 14th Russian army (…) 
and they are illegally there without our country’s consent.”328  
When asked about the perception of Russia’s objectives in Moldova, one interviewee 
described the relationship as dualistic, meaning that while official policy recognizes 
Moldova as a partner, the discrepancy that the actions do not always live up to what has 
been declared is visible.
329
 Another interviewee perceived Russia’s ambitions in a more 
radical way stating that Russia wants to have power over the country as much as 
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possible describing it with “the marionette doll” situation.330 Some of the interviewees 
believed Russia has some power over decision-making with various means such as 
economic relations or cheap gas. However, as is seen in the past, these carrots can 
quickly become sticks and have in turn negative effect. In Nye’s view these are not 
means of soft power. The interviewees were sure that Russia has some political 
decision-making leverage in the sense that Moldova is a neutral country and the issue of 
irritating or provoking Russia does influence to some extent political decision-making. 
The interviewees did not see the benefits of closer relations with Russia but at the same 
time thought that the country should commit to neutral relations. 
 
Bilateral relations: Armenia 
Armenia’s position towards Russia and other countries follows the complementarism331 
policy and Russia is also a strategic ally. Armenia in Russia’s “near abroad” was seen as 
something that Armenia was forced to accept due to some unfriendly neighbours. Some 
of the interviewees saw Russia’s ambitions to create a Eurasian Union as something that 
falls in line with hard power; also, some analysts in this regard have named Russia’s 
ambitions as “soft coercion”332. In view of the carrot and stick method, Russia is using 
the Eurasian Union as a carrot for enhancing further cooperation. However, the “pushy” 
rhetoric might be counterproductive in terms of soft power. It is crucial for soft power 
to use the methods as alluring and building on attractiveness, but currently it is not 
clear, how the Eurasian Union will “actually” work, giving ground for both positive and 
negative speculations. “It has two sides. One of them, from the nationalist perspective, 
obviously Russia dominating Armenia or dictating to some extent the fate of Armenia, it 
can be perceived as negative. On the other hand, Armenian nationalism is not directed 
at Russia. It’s on the opposite- it is directed at, you know, the regions or countries for 
which it perceives there are threats as threats, like Turkey or Azerbaijan, and in that 
way Russia is perceived as Armenian’s security guarantor, so the nationalism at that 
point does not work against Russia (…).”333 The near abroad concept was treated more 
as a neutral term but at the same time, it was perceived as something that unites the two 
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countries taking into account the military presence, economic relations and cultural 
affinity.  
In the case of Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement negotiations are held 
in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group (Russia, USA, France).
334
 Most concerns 
about the negative Russian role in the conflict resolution efforts are connected with the 
perceptions of Russia’s pursuit of underlying geopolitical interests.335 The skepticism of 
Russia “sitting on two chairs” having a close economic and military alliance with 
Armenia and a pragmatic partnership with Azerbaijan is illustrated by the fact that 
Moscow has been capitalizing on the conflict by becoming the main arms supplier to 
both sides: in 2007-2011 it provided 55% of Azerbaijan’s and 96% of Armenia’s arms 
imports.
336
 An analysis of the conflict refers that Russia’s power rests thus in the 
neutrality of the conflict and maintaining status quo concluding that Russia lacks real 
soft-power practices and incentives that could perhaps prove a valuable tool combined 
with its general clout in the region.
337
 The impact of Russo-Georgian war for Armenia 
was more perceived in the sense that South Ossetia and Abkhazia were recognized by 
Russia and this gives somewhat conformation about the issue in Nagorno-Karabakh and 
the possible resolution of the conflict. On the other hand, the border with Georgia 
during the war was closed and the trading stopped as well, so the issue did concern 
Armenians and the war itself was nothing that people wanted. The interviewees noted 
that the two frozen conflicts are extremely different in terms of Russian position in 
them. The relations are determined by the fact that Russia is there to secure Armenia. 
“There is no alternative because no-one can offer similar help.”338 One of the 
interviewees said the following “I would even sum it up that Russia does not have to 
make many efforts in terms of soft power as it has established its presence in Armenia 
very strongly in many areas, beginning with very tight cultural ties and ending with 
military and political cooperation.”339 
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The interaction between the two countries is constant and high level meetings take place 
regularly. But, as some of the interviewees mentioned, the fact that Russia sells 
weapons to Azerbaijan brings confusion among people. Armenia’s foreign policy does 
not want to be in confrontation with the “big” powers: the willingness to communicate 
with all actors is visible. The interviewees saw the Russian objectives differently; some 
of the interviewees saw Russia’s main interest in having Armenia in total dependence of 
Russia, whereas others saw Russia as the sole protector and thus having legitimate 
objectives. According to the interviewees, the influence in decision-making is visible in 
all military or defence related matters. Perhaps the issue of Russia not criticizing 
Armenia about the EU or not trying to stop the integration in an obvious way is related 
to the fact that Russia has its own and extremely important interest with regards to the 
EU, for instance visa freedom, as one interviewee noted.
340
 The limitations of what 
Russia could ask from Armenia as its strategic ally might not be as far-reaching as the 
common knowledge is (to say more bluntly, Russia controls the country’s economy and 
is militarily present ergo it dictates the country’s political decisions). For example, 
Russia has not stopped Armenia from participating in the EU’s EaP initiative. Armenia 
is not part of the Customs Union. Non of Russia’s closest allies, even Belarus for that 
matter, recognize South Ossetia or Abkhazia. There is a certain sympathy towards 
Russia that is fixed in the society and people perceive Russia as well as Russian related 
things attractive, familiar and uncontested. When it comes to Armenian diasporas living 
in Western countries, a certain shift in values as well as perception towards Russia is 
evident hence, there are mixed views among Armenians towards Russia. However, 
Armenians see Russia’s image far more appealing and positive than Moldovans. 
4.2. Different impact of Russia’s soft power 
Every country will remain unique and the power sources a country possesses determine 
to a great extent how soft power is used or how the resources are conveyed into soft 
power behaviour. However, the subject and how soft power is perceived is equally 
important in determining Russia’s soft power outcomes. As long as the imposed image 
of Russia is not what people perceive the country to be, soft power is limited. The fact 
is, however, that Russia has both the resources and the means to influence countries via 
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soft power; the question is rather, in which way the resources are being utilized. While 
Russia tries to impose its “specific” restrictions on something that is intangible in 
essence, the fundamental idea behind soft power is that it can only be controlled to 
some extent. Although the theoretical framework took into account the same power 
resources, the fact was that the resources were not equally imposed due to the social 
environment and the context of the relationship hence, a different impact was seen. 
Russia does not need to do much in Armenia, but in Moldova, the perception of Russia 
is hindered by more negative connotations. When it comes to cultural affinity, the 
region in itself is versatile. In the case of Moldova, Romania clearly plays a very 
important role in terms of influence. Russian culture has a positive image and people do 
not reject the language, but the problem is that the Russian minority does not speak the 
official language. In Moldova, Russia’s soft power image in terms of culture is mostly 
related to the historical relations of the forced imposition/assimilation of the Soviet 
culture and values, the Russian Orthodox Church presence, Russian high culture, some 
sentiment of “sovietism” and Russian media presence enhanced by Russian language. In 
Armenia, due to different circumstances with its neighbours and the fact that Russia is 
seen as a strategic ally in the region, the country is regarded as more perceptive to 
Russia’s soft power. However, Armenia is a distinct case due to its very strong national 
identity that was emphasized by most of the interviewees. Yet, Russia has an important 
role in facilitating Armenia’s identity by being its ally. As regards Armenian, Russia’s 
culture is something very close and the language factor is very important in maintaining 
Russia’s soft power. In terms of shared values, Armenian nationalism is seen as 
something unique and distinctive even though the country is closely linked to Russia. 
Russia is most successful in communicating and promoting its interest among the 
Russian minority but this does not explain Russia’s soft power influence in Armenia, 
where Russian minority is about 0,5% of the entire population. In Armenia, the cultural 
ties are deeply interconnected within the majority of the society, where Russia’s 
presence is uncontested and the receptivity is supported by the context of the 
relationship. 
With regards to Russia, there is a huge migrants’ inflow from specific countries and the 
image of Russia in the eyes of migrants (and there is a significant number of Moldovan 
and Armenian migrants in Russia) is as important on the inside as what it is trying to 
 80 
export. Namely, the indirect effect of soft power transcending from society to society or 
diaspora to diaspora experience is a crucial element of people’s perception. The author 
of the current thesis sees the issue of Russia imposing its ideas without explanation, 
acceptance and fitting into the social environment as the fundamental difference in the 
two case study countries. Russia is confusing the society in Moldova more than in 
Armenia due to the fact that its objectives, especially in the case of Transnistria, are not 
acceptable. Russia’s culture as well as values are shared and fit into the society (more 
so, with the older generation) and language is a big part of promoting its soft power 
resources. At the same time, the effect is severely undermined and contested by its 
policy towards the issue of Transnistria. In the case of Armenia, culture as well as 
values play an even more important role in uniting the two countries and they are 
supported by the fact that the military presence and economic dependence is not viewed 
as hostile action towards Armenia’s self determination. What is more, the perception of 
Russia as the security guarantor is one of the crucial elements of Russia’s soft power in 
Armenia. Hence, the overall image of Russia’s foreign policy is crucial in determining 
the perception. It has been made very clear from the research that although culture and 
values, but also economic and military resources (especially in the case of Armenia), are 
having a positive or at least neutral image (values), this is undermined by the third 
resource- policy behaviour. Although the research focused more on its foreign policy 
behaviour, domestic policy has proven to have a crucial impact as well. As long as 
Russia undermines its soft power potential by imposing harsh measures (hard power) on 
the target countries and at the same time neglecting the situation and problems at home, 
it has a limited opportunity in enhancing its soft power. Also, there is no point in trying 
to artificially create a more positive soft power image because the interaction does not 
take place in a closed space or society. Russia is treating soft power in an agent-centric 
view, whereas the concept emphasizes the importance of subject centric view and the 
context of the relationship. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Soft power is the ability to get what one wants through attraction rather than coercion. 
In order to study the effect of soft power, it is important to take into account the agent as 
well as subject and the context of the relationship. The aim of the thesis was to identify, 
if and how does soft power affect Russia’s influence in Moldova and in Armenia, how 
do these two cases vary in the same framework and what might be the reasons. The 
thesis concluded that it is more common to explain the bilateral relations in terms of 
tangible resources and political issues derived from foreign policy than it is to study the 
intangible resources that are also rooted in perceptions and receptivity. 
The author firstly analyzed how and from where Russia gets its soft power resources. 
The research focused primarily on high and pop culture exposure and consumption, 
language, media exposure and consumption, branding, (cultural) nostalgia and the 
overall assessment of the given resource as well as for values and foreign policy. 
Russia’s soft power resources are deeply embedded in its culture, values and policies. 
What is distinct in the case of Russia is the fact that much soft power comes from hard 
power resources. However, the policies of government are the crucial element in how 
Russia’s soft power is perceive in the target country. The main finding of the current 
research is that Russia uses its soft power resources in a way that does not utilize its full 
potential and with a special incentive to influence the Russian speaking minorities in 
former Soviet countries (where it is regarded as sometimes working better than the EU’s 
soft power). At the same time, Russia holds significant leverage when it comes to 
culture and media consumption and culture promotion is at the core of Russia’s soft 
power. 
Values were measured as perceived values of Russia as well as shared values of the 
target countries. Also, leadership and elite interaction and image, types of governance 
and alternative image of Russia, political discourse concepts, attractiveness of doing 
business and studying in Russia was analyzed. There was a distinct difference in how 
Russia’s values were perceived. There were a set of values such as religion and church, 
conservatism, traditional values (opposed to liberal western values) but also paternalism 
that founded Russia’s values. While the analysis of values focused also on political 
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discourse and political values, these proved to have marginal effect in target countries. 
The two case studies had a clear distinction; Moldova was seen as being largely part of 
the Western value paradigm (and striving for EU integration) whereas Armenia was 
relatively close to Russia. Traditional values, conservatism, the importance of religion 
and family were emphasized and a great deal of importance was given to the issue of 
Armenian diasporas and how this shaped the image of Russia in Armenia.  
Although Russia’s culture is highly appreciated, it has been left aside when promoting 
its “real” influence in target countries like cheap gas or foreign policy statements. 
Foreign policy was evaluated on the basis of Russia’s foreign policy concepts and 
perceived objectives, its NGO activities, bilateral relations and events that had a 
significant impact on the interaction. Both case studies had some Russia’s influence on 
their policy-making but also strived to benefit from EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative. 
In the case of Moldova, the foreign policy was labelled neutrality, in the case of 
Armenia, it was named complementarism, both of which pursued positive relations with 
Russia. In both cases, foreign policy activities that undermine Russia’s soft power were 
named. This was the core issue of Russia’s direct involvement in Transnistria and to 
some extent selling arms to Azerbaijan. However, while Russia’s presence in 
Transnistria is having a negative impact on Russia’s image, in Armenia, Russia in 
perceived as the security guarantor and the context of the relationship is enhancing 
Russia’s soft power. 
In Moldova, Russia’s soft power was seen as going hand in hand with hard power. 
Russia’s soft power in Moldova is made up from smaller “pieces” that are combined in 
a larger soft power “pool of meaning”. In Armenia, Russia’s soft power is founded on 
its hard power presence, but overall, the Soviet time nostalgia and cultural affinity is 
also a significant factor. What is more, values play an important role on how the west is 
perceived; Russia’s and Armenia’s closeness in more “layers” than one is therefore 
established. The analysis suggests that Russia has significant leverage in influencing 
target countries. However, the methods used to enhance its’ soft power are dominated 
by stick-carrot approach. The thesis confirmed the importance of image and perception 
and the distinction of how soft power is used: when soft power was used and perceived 
as controlled, soft power over someone type of way, it had a more undermining effect 
than when soft power was used to contribute to the empowerment of someone.  
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Appendix 1 
Interview question set: 
Introductory question: How would you define Russia’s soft power? 
 
1 SOFT POWER: CULTURE 
 
1.1. Do you think that culture plays an important role in Russia’s image in the given 
country? Why? 
1.2. In your opinion and perspective, how would you evaluate Russia’s cultural 
output
341
 in the given country? 
1.3. In your view, is Soviet time cultural nostalgia having an impact in the given 
country in formulating people views and opinion of Russia? Why? 
1.4. Are Russia’s cultural icons (singers, writers, actors etc) popular in the given 
country? Can you name them? 
1.5. How popular is Russia’s culture (high and popular culture) in the given country?  
1.6. Which commercial brands, in your opinion, have an impact in the given country 
and are closely related to Russia? Are they considered to have positive or negative 
connotations? Why? 
1.7. In your view, is Russia’s media outlet having a significant impact on forming 
people opinion of Russia? (In negative and positive way) 
1.8. How would you explicate Russia’s image in its near abroad342 and the countries in 
question? 
1.9. What kind of positions does the Russian language possesses in the given country in 
terms of its overall image? Why? 
1.10. Do you consider Russia’s image in the country more positive or more negative in 
terms of culture? Why? 
 
                                                 
341
 i.e. cultural export of Russia’s cultural trade and cultural activity, TV, media and network 
communications, movies, books, high and popular culture export, music and artists exposure in the given 
country. 
342
 Refers to post-Soviet states in the Russian political discourse after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
President Vladimir Putin has also called the region Russia’s “sphere of influence” that is strategically 
important to Russia especially in terms of foreign policy and value promotion 
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2 SOFT POWER: VALUES 
 
2.1. How well do you consider the countries are connected in terms of shared values? 
Which do you consider to be shared values?  
2.2. Do you see Russia’s leadership as something that the given country looks up to or 
dismisses? What about government action? 
2.3. Do you consider the perception of Russia as an alternative to western type 
democracy a commonly used discourse in the political language of the given country? 
Why 
2.4. Are the concepts of Russia’s political discourse like sovereign democracy, sphere 
of influence, protection of compatriots abroad being used in the given countries political 
discourse? If so, in what context 
2.5. Are Russia’s values perceived as legitimate, having an influence and building 
common ground in the country? Why? 
2.6. How attractive is Russia compared to the EU in the given country? Why? 
2.7. How popular is the mobility of students between Russia and the given country? 
2.8. How interconnected are the two countries in terms of doing business i.e. is doing 
business in or with Russia more common and acknowledged than with the EU 
countries? How comfortable do companies feel doing business in Russia?  
2.9. Is Russian language predominant language in doing business
343
? 
2.10 Do you consider Russia’s image in the country more positive or more negative in 
terms of its value promotion? Why? 
 
                                                 
343
 According to literature, Russian language is the predominant language of doing business in the region 
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
3 SOFT POWER: FOREIGN POLICY 
 
3.1. Are Russian sponsored NGO’s visible in the given country i.e. are they actively 
initiating projects that engage people in their activity 
3.2. How does the frozen conflict (Transnistria or Nagorno-Karabakh) affect the 
relations between Russia and the given country? 
3.3. How trustful do you see the relationship between the two countries? 
3.4. What are the most significant events in your view, starting from 2000-2012, 
between Russia and the given country that have had a crucial impact on the interaction 
between the two countries 
3.5. What do you consider to be Russia’s foreign policy objectives in the given country? 
3.6. How is Russia’s military presents seen in the given country? Why? 
3.7. In your opinion, how much political decision-making is influenced by Russia 
(leadership) in the given country? Please explicate 
3.8. Do you feel that the given country would benefit from closer relations with Russia? 
Why? 
3.9.  How would you describe Russia’s foreign policy towards the given country? 
3.10. Do you consider Russia’s image in the country more positive or more negative in 
terms of foreign policy? Why? 
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